The Kissinger Transcripts
The D.C.A.T.: "Lawyer" is to "Justice" as. . . .

SPECIAL SECTION: DEFENDING AMERICA

The Washington Monthly

APRIL 1982/$2

35 Ways to Cut the Defense Budget:
Let's Give GI Joe the Right Accessories



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Letters

What a good article by Ms. Townsend ["A Rebirth of Virtue: Religion and Liberal Renewal," February]! She even got you thinking about what is worth caring about. Me, too. I can't help but think some version of ethical uplift has got to happen one of these days in politics—not the saccharine version, but Do The Right Thing and When In Doubt, Tell The Truth.

JAMES DAVID BARBER
Durham, North Carolina

James David Barber is chairman of the department of political science at Duke University and a member of The Washington Monthly's *editorial advisory board.*

Even though I was characterized in the January issue of *Washington Monthly* as one of the Senate's eight "worst" members, I want to compliment you on February's installment of the Kathleen Kennedy Townsend article, "A Rebirth of Virtue: Religion and Liberal Renewal." It further renews my faith in the younger people of this country to read her profound article that reflects so well the principles upon which our great country was founded. We ignore these truths to our peril.

Indeed, the issue is survival and the answer is that we cannot afford to stop *trying* to be good by unofficially but effectively discarding the standards of our Judeo-Christian heritage. That answer is not a conservative or a liberal one, but an American one, a civilized one.

I have never seen a more beautiful effort to express that answer than that presented by a liberal in a liberal magazine. It is my fondest hope that liberal and conservative Americans can join hands on this issue.

JEREMIAH DENTON
Washington, D.C.

Jeremiah Denton is a U.S. senator from Alabama.

Stick to your excellent critiques of the government. History is replete with religious massacres and has certainly demonstrated that religious crusades are not the answer to governmental problems. I believe that liberals have contributed more to justice and equality than the "moral majority" you seem to be reeling towards.

SAMUEL R. LEWIS, JR.
Chicago, Illinois

"THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT now spends three times as much, per month, for interest on the federal debt, as the entire Federal Government spent, per year, at the time FDR took over and got things moving."

For a free copy of the current issue of National Review, write to Dept. W-2, 150 East 35th Street, New York, New York 10016.

How refreshing is the article by Kathleen Kennedy Townsend. What a lot does the writer have to say and from what a rich "Legacy" from her parents, of Faith, Hope, and Christian love and concern for her fellow man do her convictions come. Townsend writes with such clarity of thought and so well that the article imparts knowledge without being "preachy."

AGNES McDONALD
Chevy Chase, Maryland

Keep up the fantastic work—your magazine helps keep me sane up here at Columbia Business School. I'd like to particularly praise Charles Peters' "Platform for the Eighties" [February 1979] and the most recent issue dedicated to "Religion and Liberal Renewal." *The Washington Monthly* is on the right track in its diagnosis of America's problems. Please accept my three-year renewal as my investment in the nation's future. (But how can I use the new tax law to pay for it?!)

WILLIAM H. WOOD, III
New York, New York

Congratulations to *The Washington Monthly* for bringing religion and its potential relevance into a political magazine. Liberal partisanship has too often cut itself off from the religious and ethical roots essential for generating and keeping healthy the best of liberalism. Liberal religion itself has done the same so that neo-orthodox theology arose to bring the re-rooting needed.

Education, which originally gave us liberalism, needs to insist on old-fashioned high standards, as well as breadth of learning, if our people are to be able to cope effectively in today's and tomorrow's world. Political leaders and citizens generally, if liberal spirit is to advance, need to recover the basics of right versus wrong.

DAVID W. CAMMACK
Baltimore, Maryland

Reverend Cammack is rector of St. Mary's Episcopal church in Baltimore.

Religion is not necessary for virtue. In fact, institutions of religion have often clouded the open *human* debate about competing values, especially by their appeal to authority, opiate to so many security-minded souls begging to have their existential decisions made for their awe in response to the Universe explained to them simply.

Your devotion of so much copy to these born-again liberals is a waste. I can figure out on my own that it is OK to believe in god, and to go to church; that it may be politically wise to get along and work with believers

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and practicers from both ends of the political spectrum. *And* I can have myth, symbols, and ritual—*even* mysticism and religious experience—without god or religion. Even liberal politics.

KEVIN H. CONNAGHAN
Kansas City, Kansas

I want to express to you my admiration and my gratitude for your three articles on religion and for your editorial comments in the February issue of *The Washington Monthly*. I have been thrilled and inspired.

NELS J. ACKERSON
Noblesville, Indiana

You don't have to apologize for the religious articles in your February issue, but must they all pick on the Unitarians? I was never "exposed" to religion in the usual way, but as an adult I am aware that members of the traditional churches look at the world in a different way than I.

As a child, with an alcoholic father, I soon learned that there is no "justice" in this world. However, you don't have to believe in an afterlife to be a decent person—and most of us who doubt the existence of God and an afterlife have a real sense of responsibility for trying to right the injustice of life here and now.

I heartily agree that there is something wrong with the moral fiber of the world, but I don't think organized religion is the answer. Theology and ethics are not necessarily related—any fool can figure out that Honesty *is* the best policy.

After 64 years of thinking about life, the only possible sign of divinity that I can see is Man's ability to use his mind—and we can see all around us the disaster that occurs when we commit the "sin" of not doing so.

HAZEL BICKFORD
Mountainair, New Mexico

As a journalist working in a newsroom where the prevailing feeling on a slow day is "we need a good fire," I all too often shelve my belief in God for fear of being considered naive. But what happens when a reporter relies only on the world he can see? A lot of little things: it becomes natural to report a down stock market in a "that's too bad" inflection and an up stock market with a "happy days are here again" smile—as if the figures were a meaningful barometer of the nation's health. In the same way, an unquestioning belief (might we call it faith?) is routinely awarded to the endless statistics and studies and polls that pretend to tell us what we're like. "Objective" reporters get caught up in the scramble to find the answers to life's important questions in the pronouncements of credentialed professionals.

But nothing the experts say teaches us to deal with the death of loved ones, the decay of our bodies, and the slippery nature of wealth. That's a pretty depressing undercurrent, unless you have faith in a loving God who is with you no matter what happens. So I hope you'll include more of this brand of well-written religious articles from time to time. These days, even God could use some good PR.

DAVID ROSS
Seattle, Washington

Ms. Townsend might have considered the moral debilitation brought about by decades of nuclear proliferation. The nuclear arms race undermines in all of us that self-respect which is fundamental to the moral sense. To behave morally we must believe that what we do matters and that, as humans, we are framed to do good. The arms race is an unavoidable fact continually calling those beliefs into question.

It takes an effort of will to go on believing in the importance of our daily acts when we know that the entire human world within which we act may at any moment end in hideous destruction. Even worse, the fact of the

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This is to thank those of you who've given us assistance—and to urge even more of you to join in. We really do need your help. If you send us a story idea, a Tidbit, an Outrage, or a Memo, you can count on us to protect your identity if you do not want it disclosed.

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arms race forces us to revise our estimate of our capacity to do good. What can we think of ourselves when we know that at every given moment we are participating in preparations for global atrocity?

Ms. Townsend finds that "we're learning to live without shame." Rather, we have learned to live *with* shame. Ours is the strange compound shame of knowing that, as future victims, we do not move a muscle to stop a crime which we ourselves are preparing to commit. With that shame embedded in our individual and political life, it's little wonder that we aren't inclined to examine ourselves by the strong light of virtue.

SUSAN CHADY SCHNEIDER
Glenmoore, Pennsylvania

Your comment on a need for a rebirth of virtue in this country rang a bell with me. I have just finished writing the life of the late General George Catlett Marshall, and I know of no leader in recent American history who better exemplifies both the satisfactions and rewards that accrue to a man from a devotion to love, honor and truth in the service of his people.

Marshall's great virtue during World War II was his selflessness in repeatedly sacrificing himself in the cause of America and the Allies and the winning of the war; and, ironically enough, it was this very self-effacing quality which won him the admiration of his president, the affection of prime ministers, pesky generals and suspicious dictators, and great popularity with soldiers and civilians alike.

It was more than he asked for. When a groundswell began to draft him as a candidate for the presidency, he angrily brushed it aside as a presumption. He was offered $1 million by *The Saturday Evening Post* to write his wartime memoirs and he rejected it; not because he didn't need the money, for he had only his general's pension to live on when he retired, but because, he said, he didn't want to embarrass the generals who had served under him and the statesmen with whom he had worked by dealing frankly—and truthfully, as he felt he would need to—with how they had performed. "Reviewers will just look up the index and see what I have to say about FDR, or Churchill, or deGaulle, or Ike and Monty, just for the sake of headlines," he said.

So he told them to keep their million dollars, and got ready to retire on his pension. But of course virtue produced its own reward, and Truman drafted him first as special envoy to China and then as secretary of state. It was the first time for decades that a man filled those jobs who was mentally, emotionally, and physically incapable of telling a lie—but did a splendid job, anyway.

They should have written across his tomb at Arlington: "Here lies an honest man." He never tricked anyone. He never made a promise, to a man, woman, or child, that he did not keep. In this shoddy time of overpaid so-called heroes and shifty politicians, he is a shining example of a great American who did well by his countrymen and the world—and still kept his principles.

LEONARD MOSLEY
Captiva Island, Florida

The Washington Monthly

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VOLUME FOURTEEN NUMBER TWO
APRIL 1982

SPECIAL SECTION: DEFENDING AMERICA

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Tilting at Windmills

One thing all those people at the White House must really be proud of is what they're doing to the nation's immunization program for children. According to *The Los Angeles Times*, the 1983 budget will result in a two-million drop in the number of children immunized against diseases like diphtheria, measles, mumps, and polio. . . .

Those fellows certainly don't scare easily. A little epidemic? No sweat. Nuclear war? Keep your cool, man. Here's what Eugene Rostow, the director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency said when a senator asked him about the dangers of such a conflict: "Japan survived.". . .

Last month I got a letter from a woman who said she had recently subscribed to *The Washington Monthly* and liked it a lot, but that her husband was a civil servant and a neighbor had told her I was an enemy of government employees. I know others share her neighbor's view, and it troubles me because it means I have failed to make my real feelings clear.

I am a former government employee. I first became one in the late fifties, and from that time public service has been the breath of life for me. First, when I worked on the staff and then as a member of the West Virginia legislature, I dreaded the day the sessions would end and I would have to return to the practice of law. Then during the seven years I served as an official at the Peace Corps, I came to so love my work that I literally had nightmares about leaving it—nightmares that did not cease until I thought of starting this magazine, which of course meant that I could continue to devote my life to public affairs.

The mission of this magazine ("to help people understand our system of politics and government, where it breaks down, why it breaks down, and what can be done to make it work") has involved me in critical scrutiny of all aspects of the system, including the people who influence it—academics, journalists, lobbyists—and the people who actually perform its work—the military, the legislators, the judges, and the bureaucrats.

I think we have been no tougher on civil servants than on the others, but what we have said about the bureaucrats has, I think, been different from other criticism they have received. When they were assailed by outsiders like George Wallace, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan, the criticism could be dismissed as uninformed. But every member of *The Washington Monthly*'s original staff had worked for the federal government, so that in our first issues we were publishing articles like "The Data Game," "The Art of the Memorandum," and "The Spring Spending Spree" that showed we knew the real bureaucratic games and how they were played. We may not always be as skillful as we would want in describing and analyzing the various rituals of the culture of bureaucracy, but we have consistently given them more attention than any other publication. This delights the civil servants who share our concerns, but, unfortunately, irritates and even angers those who don't want their games exposed.

Of course, sometimes even the best civil servants don't want the facts exposed when they fear the information will be used by enemies of their agency not to reform it, but to keep it from continuing to do the good things it is doing. There are times when such concern is not unreasonable. This is one. The Reaganites don't want better government. They want, except for the military, less government—and in many areas no government at all. This is the difference between *The Washington Monthly* and the Reaganites, and it is a difference I very much want government employees to understand. We want an EPA that can defend the environment just as much as we want a military that can defend our country. We think government could be leaner and more efficient and wish we had a president who was trying to do just that instead of trying to starve one part and fatten the other. . . .

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A suggestion for my fellow journalists: Keep your eye on the big oil companies. What has been good for the rest of us—the relief from inflation brought about by declining oil prices—has not been good for them. You can be sure that their lobbyists are trying desperately to think of legislative proposals that will sound oh so statesman-like but that will just happen to have the effect of increasing oil prices. . . .

Have you heard what's happened to Jerry Rubin? He is running what he calls "Networking Salons" at a New York City night club called The Underground. "Ah," you say, "obviously he is getting together another group of revolutionaries. The air will vibrate with chants of 'Che,' 'Mao,' 'social justice,' and 'the masses.' "

Well, not quite. Here's how Jerry describes it:

"Networking is the high-level way for successful, powerful, and attractive people to meet one another and make connections in the 1980s. . . . At the Networking Salon, people eagerly meet and exchange greetings, sometimes even business cards, in a very relaxed, fun, party atmosphere. At the Networking Salon, relationships are started, deals are seeded, exciting adventures launched, lives changed, romances tempted, and a fun, engaging time is had by all. If you meet one exciting new person that you see again, for financial or friendship reasons, the Salon is a success for you!". . .

This year 127,530 men and women are enrolled in law schools. These are among our ablest and most talented young people, who, if they had chosen productive work, would be on the cutting edge of the economic recovery we so desperately need, but who are at this very moment sitting in some library desperately trying to focus their eyeballs on *Corpus Juris.* Surely it is time to quote the greatest sentence ever written about the law. It appears—you would never guess—in an article in this magazine called "Now You're Thinking Like a Lawyer," by Michael Kinsley and Charles Peters. The sentence, written, alas, not by me but by Kinsley, an alumnus of *The Washington Monthly* who recently became editor of *Harper's:*

"...anthropologists of the next century will look back in amazement at an arrangement whereby the most ambitious and brightest members of each generation were siphoned off the productive work force, trained to think like a lawyer, and put to work chasing one another around in circles.". . .

The committee for the Silver Anniversary Celebration of the Joffrey Ballet includes such great balletomanes as Ed Meese, James A. Baker, the attorney general, and assorted prominent lobbyists. You will recall whose son dances with the Joffrey troupe. . . .

One of the unhappy consequences of Reagan's preference for less government instead of better government is the chaos resulting from the RIFs (reductions in force) now being carried out in the federal government. People are being fired on the basis, not of ability, but of seniority. Someone who has been around a long time can "bump" a younger employee even though the junior is much more talented and dedicated. It is the suspicion of my old friend Bob Lane, a veteran bureaucrat, that the RIF rules are so stupid because they were formulated by the same people whom the government would want to get rid of first.

Government administrators, it must be remembered, tend to assign their star employees to priority matters. The RIF rules were developed during the years when the government was expanding and procedures for reducing personnel scarcely seemed worthy of any priority. Thus the less able tended to be assigned to RIF rule-making. Naturally they were not passionate advocates of hiring or firing on the basis of ability, since such a standard was unlikely to further their careers. They also tended to be older, rather than younger, since policy formulation is usually assigned to senior officials. The resulting policies thus protected the same people who devised them. And that is just what the RIF rules are doing today: protecting the senior rather than the able. . . .

But if there is demoralization in the bureaucracy, think what must be the situation at the White House. The majority of the top White House staff, led by Baker and Stockman, urgently advocated a substantial cut in the defense budget. Reagan turned them down in September. Then they said we've got to increase revenues. Reagan turned them down in January. And you have to know that if White House visitors like Bob Packwood find that the president's anecdotes are "on a totally different track" from the issues being discussed, the White House staff gets a daily diet of similar irrelevancy. Think of the aides cringing in the wings during one of those press conferences where Reagan distorts one fact after another. And can't you imagine those emergency meetings in the West Wing as the same aides wonder how the hell they're going to prove that he tithes? . . .

My recommendation of an embargo against Japanese cars has not won instant acclaim. I think the reason is that the liberals' normal bias in favor of free trade, which I share, is reinforced by a desire for vengeance against Detroit for all the gas-guzzling, air-polluting lemons it has inflicted on us over the years. I must say I share that feeling, too. Did you hear that the head of American Motors recently said, "I think we should return to the days of planned obsolescence"? Yet however

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much our auto industry may deserve to die, my question is, can we afford to let it? Do you really think we're ready to shift into a high-tech economy overnight and withstand the impact of the death of our great auto manufacturers and of all their suppliers?...

As this issue was going to press, Japanese and American trade talks were going on in Tokyo and the Japanese reportedly were ready to make a concession. Japan announced, according to Sam Jameson of *The Los Angeles Times*, that it was willing "to begin talks in October on its post-1983 beef and citrus fruit import quotas and to set up a working group to discuss its remaining quotas on agricultural imports." The key words here are "begin," "October," "talk," "post-1983," and "discuss." This is the same kind of run-around, always delivered with a smiling face, the Japanese have been giving us on trade for years. I'm not surprised by the run around or the smiles. Japan's leaders are in their fifties and sixties. Many of them fought against us in World War II. Many more had brothers, sisters, fathers, and mothers incinerated or maimed by us. If you were in their shoes, do you think you would weep at the plight of the American auto industry or the fact that American agricultural products don't get fair access to Japanese markets?...

Speaking of boring jobs, covering the White House as a reporter is one of the champs, with long hours of just waiting around for opportunities to listen to mostly meaningless briefings. But if it sounds good to be called an attorney, it sounds even better to be called a White House correspondent. This helps explain a statement recently made to Richard Halloran of *The New York Times* by a Washington news executive:

"Nothing is more painful than the look on the face of a reporter who has been told that he or she must turn in the White House press pass because someone else needs it more; nor is there any look quite so seraphic as that on the face of one told he or she has just been added to the list of White House press pass holders."...

Howard Baker says he still wants to be president someday. He doesn't have to wait. Reagan has abdicated if not in fact, then certainly in the judgment of serious people. And it is up to Congress to fill the void. I know I've beat this drum before, but I can't emphasize how important it is for Congress at this moment in our history to rise above its ordinary level of behavior and give the nation the leadership it needs. Otherwise, I fear that as awareness of Reagan's ineptitude spreads through the country, there will be a collapse of public confidence that could lead to economic disaster.

The press has a crucial role to play in encouraging Congress to do its duty. Senators and representatives who try to act responsibly should be singled out for praise. Those who continue to pork barrel and practice lowest common denominator politics should be singled out for scorn.

One proposal you should urge your congressman to support is one advocated by Senator Gary Hart and Representatives Richard Gephardt and David Bonior that would require the inclusion of tax expenditures—the $266 billion in indirect subsidies provided by tax benefits—in the budget process. If OMB and the Congress were required to confront these expenditures each year they would realize, according to the congressional budget office, that narrowing or eliminating the worst loopholes could decrease the deficit by $22 billion in FY 1983 alone, and by more than $85 billion in FY 1987. And the CBO's reforms are not all that bold. For example, one proposal is to tax one half of the social security benefits of recipients with incomes over $25,000. This would save $1.6 billion in 1983, rising to $3.1 billion in 1987. But these savings could be doubled if the entire benefit were taxed. And just imagine what would be saved if this magazine's view were adopted and people making over $25,000 received no social security payments at all....

The essence of Washington was captured by the first words of a recent *New York Times* obituary: "Ralph E. Casey, a former government lawyer who sharply criticized excessive subsidies to private shipping companies and who later became the chief spokesman for a large segment of that industry."...

Since a recent magazine names me as a member of a movement called neo-liberalism (in an article by Randall Rothenberg in the February issue of *Esquire*), a lot of people have been asking me, "What on earth *is* neo-liberalism?" My short answer—I won't ask you to endure the long one—is that, if the neo-conservatives are liberals who took a critical look at liberalism and decided to be conservatives, the neo-liberals are liberals who took the same look but decided to retain their humane goals while abandoning the prejudices—pro-government, pro-union, anti-defense, and anti-business—that they realized were blinding them to the true nature of many of the nation's problems. The entrepreneur who creates new jobs and better products is our hero because the money for people who need help is not going to come from a dying economy. We want a strong national defense but not a stupid wasteful one. We tend to support regulation that protects health and safety and oppose regulation that stifles healthy competition. We oppose credentialism, the measuring of people by the degrees they possess and the titles they have held, and urge evaluation on the basis of performance. Instead of scorning people who value

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family, country, and religion, we believe in reaching out to them to make clear that our programs are rooted in the same values. . . .

Marva Collins, the Chicago teacher who started her own school to help black children and who's received a lot of publicity for her apparent success, has come under fire lately. Some of the criticism may be justified, but one charge—that she lacks a teaching certificate—is the sort of thing that makes me feel desperate, particularly since *The New York Times* reported the charge without the slightest suggestion that a teacher's certificate may not have any relation to teaching ability. The tip is that teacher's certificates are not required by the best private schools. What they care about is that the teacher know his subject and be able to teach it.

I first began to suspect there was something wrong with paper credentials when, after being told that I had made a record high score on the army's language aptitude test, I signed up for French at Columbia and received a C the first term, an F the second term, an F in my initial attempt to repeat the second term, and finally a passing grade and permission to graduate from a merciful dean who suspended the language requirement. My problem was that I had absolutely no ear and that my attempts to pronounce French with my Appalachian accent had my fellow students rolling in the aisles.

Then I went to law school and quickly realized that the law school aptitude test did not measure the ability to persuade a jury or the ability to think of an original argument. I later learned that there was no written test that could measure a surgeon's ability to make the right incision in the right place. When I worked for the Peace Corps, I discovered that written tests predicted outstanding volunteers far less well than the words used in their references. We found, for example, that even close friends and family members would not use the word "respect," meaning "I respect him or her," unless they really meant it. Repeated use of the word in references was one of the most reliable indications of future success in the field. . . .

It might not seem that a work written in the first century A.D. would have much bearing on cost overruns on the F-18 fighter or the M-1 tank. But consider this interesting passage in Vitruvius's *De Architectura:*

"In the famous and important Greek city of Ephesus there is said to be an ancient ancestral law, the terms of which are severe but its justice is not inequitable. When an architect accepts the charge of a public work, he has to promise what the cost of it will be. His estimate is handed to the magistrate, and his property is pledged as security until the work is done. When it is finished, if the outlay agrees with his statement, he is complimented by decrees and marks of honour. If no more than a fourth has to be added to his estimate, it is furnished by the treasury and no penalty is inflicted. But when more than one fourth has to be spent in addition on the work, the money required to finish it is taken from his property."

Don't let me pull your leg—I don't spend my evenings leafing through Vitruvius—a reader sent me the passage—but it does seem to me that he, or to be precise, the Ephesians, have the solution to the problem of government contracting: if more than a 25 percent overrun occurs, let the contractor pay it instead of the government. . . .

Bob Packwood apologized to Reagan for the remarks about the president's irrelevant anecdotes. And Rep. Newt Gingrich has apologized to James Baker for asserting that Baker had damaged Republican chances in the 1982 election. But the White House shouldn't count on such calls continuing indefinitely. There has already been a sharp drop in the administration's standing and continued economic decline could provide the same dramatic turn-around for Reagan's White House as Richard Nixon's experienced in 1973. In January of that year, the White House staff wasn't returning congressional calls. By the end of April it was the congressmen who weren't returning the calls. Let that chill wind blow on the backs of your necks, fellows, and come up with a sensible economic program in time to save yourselves from such indignity. . . .

One of the connections made by Garry Wills in his new book *The Kennedy Imprisonment* is between the sexual adventurer and the tough-guy winner—with the need to dominate women sexually and men in terms of power—as the common denominator. This connection has often been made in analyzing the generation I grew up with—the men of the thirties, forties and fifties. Sometimes the connection is really there, but more often, and certainly in the case of Jack Kennedy, it is either not there at all or is quite weak.

Let me use a friend as an example. Let's call him Stan. I first met him in his early twenties. He was a delightfully amusing man without a mean streak of any kind or any need to dominate others—he was in fact the best listener I have ever known. Yet his desire for women was insatiable. He is now in his late fifties and he hasn't changed a bit.

Recently another friend visited Stan, who met him at the airport. On the way home, Stan stopped at the supermarket and bought a bag of groceries, which he proceeded to put in the trunk. My other friend said, "Why are you putting the groceries in the

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trunk?" Stan explained that he had a date with a young woman the next morning and needed to use a trip to the Safeway as an excuse to his wife for getting out of the house.

Stan is an adulterer—not a good thing—and he is a compulsive one—also not a good thing. But to say he does it out of a need to dominate is just plain wrong.

I've known a lot of Stans. I think Jack Kennedy was one. Once when we were working a crowd in West Virginia during the 1960 primary—I ran the campaign in one county and often acted in other elevated capacities such as driver, gofer, and pusher-through-the-crowds—he nudged me and said, "Let's move toward that blonde over there on the left." I said, "Senator, that's my wife!" He grinned apologetically, and I was not angry because I felt he was a Stan. Still I did guide him to the right, which was always prudent behavior for husbands who had to deal with Stans.

The sexual adventuring of a Stan grew out of a romantic view of women—the desire was not to conquer but to find out what it would be like with this attractive woman who had an air of mystery about her precisely because she wasn't sitting in the next office at your law firm. You would not necessarily quickly tire of one woman—Stan has been married for 25 years—but you would retain the same curiosity about every other attractive woman you met.

I don't think there is any evidence—certainly not in Judith Exner's book—that Jack Kennedy ill-used his women. He was a Stan. The evidence of that fact in his public career was the Cuban missile crisis. If he had been governed by a need to dominate he would have followed the strong advice he was getting to bomb the hell out of Cuba and would not have come up with the blockade strategy, which made it easy for the Russians to avoid armed confrontation. And certainly if he had been a truly macho saber-rattler, he would not have sent his brother to assure Ambassador Dobrynin that we would pull our missiles out of Turkey if the Russians took theirs out of Cuba.

I think Wills would have been closer to the truth if he had said that while Kennedy wasn't a tough guy, he didn't want people to find out he wasn't. Many of us of that generation, however much we dreaded having that fullback run over us, didn't want the world to know about our fear.

What got Kennedy in trouble—or what brought out the worst in him—was this need not to be found out. Any careful reader of the history of the Bay of Pigs cannot escape the conclusion that Kennedy wanted to cancel the landing but was bluffed out of doing so by Allen Dulles, who argued that the Cuban exile brigade, if

Somebody Does Have Some Intelligent Alternatives...



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disbanded, would spread throughout the world the word that Kennedy was chicken. Kennedy's next worst moment came when, in what must have been an effort to hide his concession on the Turkish missiles, he leaked a story to Charles Bartlett and Stewart Alsop condemning Adlai Stevenson for having suggested just such a concession. So Kennedy wasn't always nice—far from it—but he simply wasn't one of those men who liked to beat up on the other fellows....

There is considerable evidence that Japanese workers are inspired to better performance by job security. While I'm sure that some American workers would respond similarly, it has been my conviction that most would not. A recent study of professional baseball players, reported in *Psychology Today*, supports my view:

"Researchers examined the records of 38 pitchers during the three years before and after they signed contracts for three or more years.... As long as they had to get their contracts renewed each year, the players who eventually won long-term berths improved steadily, from an average of 3.66 earned runs scored against them per game in 1974 to 2.91 in 1976. After signing their long-term agreements, however, their earned run averages climbed to an average of 4.04 three years later....

A book you must read is *Commodity Prices and the New Inflation*, by Barry Bosworth and Robert Z. Lawrence. While it is often even duller than its title, it is truly important, explaining the inflation of the seventies in a way that desperately needs to penetrate the minds of other economists, particularly those at the Federal Reserve and at the White House. It demonstrates that the primary cause of the new inflation of the 1970s was the price of commodities, particularly that of oil, and that those prices were determined, not by market forces but by government, most especially the OPEC cartel. So if you're worried about another round of inflation, worry about what we're doing to prevent future escalation in commodity prices (e.g., stockpiling and enacting standby gasoline rationing authority) and pray that the Federal Reserve will stop killing us with its assumption that low interest rates cause inflation.

The idea that low interest rates cause inflation has now become the conventional wisdom among both liberal and conservative economists. Recently on "Face the Nation," George Herman, using a tone of withering condescension he has not equaled since he inquired about Tom Eagleton's shaking hands in 1972, asked Fritz Mondale, who seemed to be straying into Keynesianism, if he did not realize that if the Fed took the brakes off interest rates, rampant inflation would result. Mondale abjectly agreed that Herman was absolutely right.

I think what has happened is that liberals, who historically have opposed high interest rates, so love to make Vietnam and Lyndon B. Johnson into villains that they have adopted as sacred writ an idea most recently expressed in *Time*:

"Most economists believe that the great inflation stems from Lyndon Johnson's desire to print more money to pay for both the Great Society and Vietnam rather than reveal to the voters the true cost of the war." Johnson's policies did produce inflation, but it was the single-digit variety the American economy can live with, not the double-digit OPEC version that has almost wrecked us in the last decade.

In my lifetime there has been no double-digit inflation in this country caused by printing money. In fact the only other time we had double-digit inflation—1947—it was caused by something very similar to the cause in the seventies: government-dictated shortages. Because the government quite rightly decided during the war to produce military rather than civilian goods, there was a shortage of such goods after the war and prices went up until production caught up with demand, just as OPEC's cartel strategy drove oil prices up until demand declined.

There is one other reason that people don't accept the importance of OPEC in the inflation of the seventies. They argue that if OPEC caused our inflation, why didn't it cause that much inflation in Japan and West Germany, which used a higher percentage of OPEC oil than we did? But it didn't matter what oil we were using—the world price followed OPEC's price—and we were using far more oil—50 percent of the world's total supply in 1979—than Japan, West Germany, and any other country. So the impact on our economy of the oil price increases was far greater.

Low interest rates don't cause inflation—look at the fifties and early sixties, when you could get a four-percent loan and there was no inflation at all. High interest rates can control inflation but at the cost of a recession, and recession, not inflation, is our problem now. What do you see today? Skyrocketing prices? No. People losing jobs? Yes....

The Soviet Union's leading expert on the United States, Georgi A. Arbatov, recently asked our government for a 13-day visa to visit this country. The Reagan administration cut his visit to five days. It had previously denied his request to extend an earlier visit. This is insane. If misunderstanding of one another is among the greatest dangers between the Soviet Union and the United States, we should want Arbatov to spend all the time he wants here....

—*Charles Peters*

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

35 Ways to Cut the Defense Budget

By Jonathan Alter and Phil Keisling

In 1956 Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote a letter to a friend named Sweed Hazlett. "Some day there is going to be a man sitting in my chair who has not been raised in the military services and who will have little understanding of where slashes in their [the military's] estimates can be made with little or no damage," he wrote. "If that should happen while we still have the state of tension that now exists in the world, I shudder to think what could happen in this country."

Well, Eisenhower wasn't too far off. The man now sitting in his chair doesn't have that understanding, and a high state of international tension still exists. But what Ike had no way of knowing was that there would be a third factor hardly imaginable in the booming 1950s: the effect of enormous and ill-considered defense spending on a sick economy. If Ronald Reagan's $1.6 trillion five-year defense plan is set in motion this year, the effect on the future of the American economy will be very great. So great, in fact, that other major policy decisions weighed in Washington today—on energy or education or El Salvador—pale by comparison.

The problem is not this year's deficit, but the prospect of huge, unavoidable, debilitating deficits in the years to come. It isn't just that these

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deficits will bring more inflation and high interest. The greater worry is that a *perception* of worsening conditions will lead to a fear of long-term investment. Take the bond market. The administration's defense plan, which would make Reagan the most profligate spender and biggest budget-buster the nation has ever known, threatens to kill it for good.

This might not seem of much interest beyond Wall Street, which is very nervous right now. But by destroying the willingness of investors to pass up quick profits for long term gains, Reagan's program threatens to destroy the very driving force behind our economy.

The trap the president is laying for himself and the rest of us is not unrecognized by the men who surround him. Last fall, James Baker and David Stockman pressed very hard for a slower rate of military growth. They lost the fight. Now it is up to Congress to pick up the gauntlet and save the country from a defense program that could not only wreck the economy, but weaken the military at the same time.

How can more money equal less defense? The answer, as many have been discovering, is that the enormous sums too often are devoted to small numbers of highly sophisticated weapons. We are putting too many of our eggs in too few baskets. The more money we spend, the fewer planes, submarines, and tanks we seem to get. But it is increasingly clear that the so-called "quantity versus quality" debate does not convey the whole story. Often, large numbers of simple, practical weapons are preferable to small numbers of complex ones, not only because they are cheaper and more effective en masse, but because even *one-to-one* the simpler weapons work better. Next to saving the economy, this effort to rebuild our military machinery along more workable lines should be Congress's highest priority as it reviews the Reagan plan.

Some members of Congress, among them liberals like Les Aspin, believe that little money can be saved next fiscal year by making these changes. They argue that the peculiarities of procurement are such that although the "budget authority" for weapons Reagan requested is high for fiscal 1983, the so-called "outlays"—the money actually to be spent by the Pentagon on weapons—is low by comparison. ("Budget authority" means the amount of money the government can obligate to be spent in a given fiscal year.) The explanation for the difference lies in the means by which the weapons are built—the "spend-out" process. Because of low start-up costs on many projects, budget authority in a given year can reach into the billions, while actual outlays total only a few million. This has led Aspin and a number of others to conclude that while large cuts may be possible down the road, only about $10 billion in outlays can be trimmed off Reagan's $215 billion request.

Even liberals like Les Aspin think we can't save more than $10 billion in outlays in fiscal 1983. But by scrapping bad weapons immediately—in fiscal 1982—it's possible to save much, much more.

But Aspin and other pessimists make a key—and wrong—assumption: namely that when it comes to weapons procurement, Congress can't even begin to cut spending until FY 1983. Here's where Aspin's argument on the "spend-out" process can lead to larger savings than he thinks.

Three concepts are important to understanding this crucial point: 1) budget obligation authority, or the amount of money Congress appropriates for obligation by the Pentagon in a given fiscal year; 2) the value of contracts actually signed, which is the amount legally obligated during the fiscal year; and 3) cash paid by the government to carry out these contracts from this and previous years. This means there are two ways to cut the deficit off at the pass. First, the government can stop paying money for existing contracts, which involves some cancellation penalties that are not as bad as many think. The government is liable only for lost profits and expenses already incurred, which are usually far less than the face amount of the contract. Secondly, there are savings from contracts the government hasn't signed. If the Pentagon is like most government agencies, with the fiscal year now half over it has signed fewer than half the contracts it is authorized to. By simply rescinding this unused obligation authority *right now* in the case of weapons of dubious value, Congress could save money in FY 1982. Far more dramatic savings in outlays than the Aspin theory hints at would occur in FY 1983.

To illustrate this, let's look at the F-18 fighter. By refusing to sign new contracts and canceling some existing ones, total outlay savings in FY 1983 would approach $2 billion, according to an aide to Rep. Bruce Vento, a sharp opponent of the plane. That's because much of the money appro-

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priated in 1981 and 1982 actually won't be spent until 1983 and 1984, and money not spent can emerge in the form of outlay savings—much of it in 1983. Apply this principle to a host of other weapons systems and it's easy to see that outlay savings of $20 billion for the total defense budget might be, if anything, conservative.

If Reagan could use this strategy to dismantle various social programs—and he did last year when he pushed through large budget recisions—there's no reason Congress can't do the same for bad weapons. It would be an unprecedented act, but in this case haste and daring are on the side of responsibility—not just economic, but military. If we wait much longer, it will be a lot harder to do anything. The budget will be committed, the economy in shambles, and our soldiers saddled with weapons that jeopardize their lives and our security.

Thus our argument for large-scale cancellations is a call to cut our losses. It's time to stop throwing good money after bad and start providing an incentive for the right kind of performance by the defense industry. As Alain Enthoven, one of Robert McNamara's "whiz kids" puts it, "Without the clear and present danger of cancellation, it is very hard to get contractors to even begin to control costs."

It's also important to understand that cost overruns, as egregious as they are, are not at the root of our defense problems. Too often they serve as a handy way for liberals to jump into the defense debate without becoming involved in the more difficult issue of whether particular weapons and other elements of the defense program are working as they should. The latter requires a sustained effort to learn about "probability of kill," depot management, and all sorts of other things many people don't find very appealing or interesting. Of course if that effort is not made, the nation will have no choice but to accept the judgment and assumptions of those who believe the way to make the military perform is to throw money at it.

On the other hand, if we can bring ourselves to look closely at these problems, a number of very substantial savings are possible, not only in weaponry, but in the more prosaic realm of paychecks, airplane hangers, army bases, and the like. These areas account for tremendous expenditure. In fact, 60 percent of the Pentagon's outlays in fiscal year 1983 will consist of three things: active duty military pay ($44 billion), retired military personnel pay ($16.5 billion), and operations and maintenance ($67 billion). The O&M price tag alone is more than the budgets of the departments of agriculture, HUD, interior, transportation, energy, and the EPA combined. To cut the defense budget by any substantial amount, especially in this fiscal year, obviously requires cuts in those areas.

But the conventional wisdom on Capitol Hill nowadays is that these are exactly the places that must not be touched. Cut money from salaries and benefits, we're told, and you'll hurt morale. Cut from O&M and planes won't be repaired, tanks won't have enough gas to move, and ill-trained soldiers won't know how to fight.

There's some truth to this. In past years Congress didn't appropriate enough money for such things as spare parts and jet fuel, often because the Pentagon didn't ask for it.

But the current enthusiasm for "readiness" runs a different risk. Spurred by horror stories of grounded planes, for example, Congress has been on a spare parts spending spree in the last two years. Having had its spare parts budget recently tripled, the air force hasn't been able to spend its money fast enough.

Call this new danger the "Mayaguez fallacy," named for the American freighter captured in 1975 by Cambodia. None of the U.S. ships dispatched to the scene could sail at full speed because of unmet maintenance needs, an incident often cited by congressmen favoring wholesale increases in the O&M budget. The fallacy lies in the fact that it was the navy's own decisions that slowed its ships. While repair work went untended, money was going to keep open idle shipyards, provide free medical care to retired naval officers and their dependents, and subsidize commissaries and exchanges so sailors could buy inexpensive blue jeans. More O&M money, even a lot of it, probably wouldn't have made much difference.

To call O&M the federal government's largest slush fund is an exaggeration—but not much of one. Base commanders now can take money earmarked for flying hours and replace the pool table in the officers' club. Nor is much effort made to rank needs by logical priorities. While army soldiers shiver in uninsulated German barracks, $5 million goes for personal servants for 300 top Pentagon officials. Those who know this budget well—experts at OMB, on Capitol Hill, and even at the Pentagon—confess they are mystified by it. "It's a virtual swamp," says a congressional aide who's dealt with O&M for nearly a decade. "When you get down to it, we can't tell whether money's going to repair a runway so planes don't crash or to paint all the barracks at a base pink, green, and dayglo orange."

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Or earth tones—the colors chosen recently by the commander at the Langley, Virginia Tactical Air Command base. As extra money went for this purpose, pilots grumbled about the lack of flying hours. One colonel observes, "In the 1950s the air force had rattletrap bases, but the equipment flew and people were happy. Now we have nice quarters, two-inch thick carpet, and an air conditioner blowing in our faces—but the planes won't fly and people are miserable."

So it's up to Congress to delve into the *specifics* of how defense money is spent and not rely just on across-the-board increases or decreases of this percentage or that. As seldom before, the fate of both the nation's economy and its real military strength are dependent on effective congressional oversight.

Congressional attention should also be focused on the larger strategic assumptions that underlie Pentagon spending. In late February, the senior planners for the four military services told a Senate subcommittee that $1.6 trillion over five years *might not be enough* to fulfill all of the missions for which they have been told to prepare. (Earlier it had been leaked that Richard D. DeLauer, the Pentagon's research director, believed an additional $750 billion would be required over five years.)

This suggests that it may be time to begin a complete reassessment of the role of the U.S. military around the world. Do we really need 15 naval battle groups? Do we really need enough land war capability in Europe to meet the "long war" scenario the administration envisions?

If more of the nation's strategic assumptions were changed, the large cuts outlined here could be even larger. But even if they aren't, the task can begin. We agree with the numerous military reformers on Capitol Hill, in the Pentagon, and outside the government who stress that the best decisions—and biggest savings—depend on taking a long-range view of defense needs. Still, the recommendations below also reflect our belief that many savings can begin right away. As authority for that, we point to a man with a certain reputation for budget acumen: David Stockman. Late last summer, Stockman found a way to trim at least $11 billion *in outlays alone* from Reagan's 1983 defense budget, and he didn't even touch the B-1 or MX. For those looking for immediate, sensible reductions, Stockman's proposals are a good place to start (see sidebar).

How David Stockman Wanted to Cut the Defense Budget

David Stockman did more than talk about Trojan horses and trickle-down economics in his celebrated *Atlantic* interview. He also referred to the "swamp of $10-20-30 billion of waste" in the Pentagon's budget. What's more, he tried to do something about it.

For a few brief weeks late last summer it was high political drama. On one side was Stockman, urging significant reductions in the administration's rapidly growing defense budget. On the other was Secretary Weinberger, holding fast to the 1.6 trillion-dollar five-year program. One can only guess what ultimately turned the tide in Weinberger's favor. Perhaps Reagan didn't want to appear "weak" on defense. Or maybe it was the defense secretary's visual aids: one of them a large, rifle-toting soldier to depict his budget's proposed troop levels,and a much smaller soldier—*sans* rifle—to depict Stockman's alternative.

The Washington Monthly has learned the essential detail's of Stockman's budget cuts, and they put the lie to those timid legislators who would settle for only $5 billion to $10 billion this year. For the fiscal year 1983 budget, Stockman's proposed reductions totaled $18 billion in budget authority and over $11 billion in outlays. More important, Stockman's plan left intact such items as the MX missile, the B-1 bomber, the Trident submarine, the M-1 tank, and a host of other dubious weapons.

Most of Stockman's cuts involved simply stretching out Weinberger's increases. The navy's shipbuilding program would be cut slightly, producing 587 ships by 1990 instead of 600. That would still give the navy 100 more ships than it had in 1981. The number of active duty personnel would rise, but not as fast. Some non-essential military construction projects would be deferred. The rate of

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WEAPONS

Some of these weapons should be canceled cold, some should be modified, and many should be replaced by cheaper, more effective alternatives. The savings here reflect the cost of such substitutions. Because of the Pentagon's drawn-out procurement system, the fiscal year 1983 budget authority savings cannot simply be subtracted from the federal deficit. But the total FY 1983 budget authority savings amassed here, $31 billion, should give you some idea of how much money obligated to the Pentagon in a given year for weapons alone can be better spent elsewhere.

The "total program savings" reflects the projected savings through 1987 and beyond with the substitutions. Our figure adds up to $190 billion, but because that figure is in 1982 dollars and because it doesn't account for inevitable future overruns (some of these programs have been doubling in cost every two or three years) the eventual price tag will be far higher.

Aircraft

1. Cancel the B-1 Bomber

The United States needs an effective manned bomber, if for no other reason than that in the case of nuclear war a bomber, unlike a missile, can be retrieved in mid-flight if the combatants decide they didn't mean to destroy the world after all. But the B-1, which will cost $20-30 billion over the next five years, is not that airplane. Among those who favor development of a new manned bomber (others believe the cruise missile is enough), the conventional argument against the B-1 is that the Advanced Technology Bomber, or "Stealth," will be ready by 1992. Even the former commander of the Strategic Air Command, Richard Ellis, worries that the B-1 will siphon off money and effort from Stealth, which is touted as being so effective a penetration bomber that it will not even show up on Soviet radar.

All the same, if the B-1 were a good bomber, it might be worth building anyway; it could be equipped with the cruise missile or used as a jack-of-all-trades plane, much as the B-52 is today. The problem is that the B-1 is not a good bomber. Five

growth in the operations and maintenance account would be reduced and tied to inflation. Real growth for non-major procurement would fall from 18 percent to 16 percent a year. Stockman also proposed cuts in administrative overhead and civilian pay raises; military pay raises were left intact.

Only a few weapons, totaling about $2.7 billion in 1983 outlay savings, made Stockman's hit list. The major two were the F-18 fighter and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. Stockman recommended that both be canceled and replaced by cheaper, more reliable alternatives: A-7s and F-4s for the F-18 and an unpgraded M-113 armored personnel carrier for the Bradley. Also canceled were the AH-64 attack helicopter, the Lamp III helicopter, the HARM missile, and the DIVAD anti-aircraft gun. Reagan did agree with Stockman about canceling the C-X transport plane—only to revive the ill-starred C-5 in its place.

The real artistry of Stockman's plan was that it still allowed Reagan to keep all his campaign promises about increasing defense spending by seven percent real growth—that's growth *after* inflation. Under Stockman's plan, real defense spending would have been 36-percent higher in 1986 than it was in 1981. The Pentagon's share of the federal budget would increase from one quarter to almost one third.

How could Stockman save so much money while still advocating the largest military buildup in peacetime U.S. history? It's all in the numbers, although if anyone was playing games with them last summer, it was Weinberger, not Stockman.

The shenanigans went like this: Jimmy Carter's fiscal year 1981 budget for defense called for $180 billion in budget authority. Soon after his inauguration, Reagan proposed a 1982 budget of $214 billion—a real increase of 12 percent. Stockman, who characterized this budget as "a blank check for the Pentagon," advocated the obvious: Reagan's five-year program should be based on Carter's last budget. But Weinberger argued that Reagan should up the ante and use 1982 as a base. The nation might not be in such a giving mood in later years, Weinberger argued; better to stuff as much money as possible into the budget now. Reagan bought this argument despite warnings by his top aides that it would increase the overall 1983 federal deficit to about $50 billion. The deficit is now estimated to be at least $90 billion. In fact, between Weinberger's victory last summer and this February, budget authority for 1983 actually increased by $4 billion.

Legislators would do well to use Stockman's sensible suggestions as a starting place for further cuts. Of course Stockman can hardly defend his plan today, having been pressed into service to defend the administration's budget. But he deserves credit for having tried. Now it's Congress's turn to wade into the Pentagon swamp to approve the legitimate claims on the federal treasury while it rejects the weak ones.

—*P.K.*

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years ago, Jimmy Carter canceled production after becoming convinced the plane was a lemon. Congress, displaying its usual respect and admiration for Carter's decisions, continued development funding for the plane anyway. By the time Reagan announced his intention to revive the project, the B-1 was heavier (it is now approaching the weight of the B-52) and thus less maneuverable.

Unfortunately, such maneuverability is exactly what is required for the bomber's principal mission—penetration of Soviet air space. This mission demands that the plane be able to fly subsonic at low altitudes and dodge Soviet fire. The B-1's major flaw is that it was designed for the opposite function, high-altitude supersonic flight, an approach that has been rendered virtually obsolete in recent years by advances in Soviet radar and missile technology. Trying to use a high altitude plane with a small wingspan for a low-altitude, radar-avoiding function—especially this most essential of functions—doesn't make much sense. Meanwhile, advances in Soviet long-wave radar may jeopardize even Stealth, which is also believed by some defense analysts to be too big and unmaneuverable.

As for using the B-1 to restore strength to our conventional bomber fleet, that might work if the planes could be built in large numbers. But they can't be. In order to reach the Mach 2 supersonic speeds the air force continues to believe are necessary, the B-1 must include expensive features—titanium skin, movable wings, and super-reamed engines—that have driven the cost to more than $200 million a copy. That means the U.S. can afford only about 100 of them.

Budget authority savings FY 1983	**$3.5 billion**
Total program cost savings	**$21 billion**

2. Replace the F-18 Hornet

Originally envisioned as the Veg-A-Matic of warplanes, this $35 million-plus-per-copy plane (double the cost of two years ago) was supposed to solve all the fighter and light attack problems of both the navy and the marines—four functions in all. Now with its performance problems unarguable, it is envisioned by the military for only two of those roles—navy light attack and marine fighter—and it will do an inferior job filling those.

The F-18 accelerates at transonic speed less rapidly than the F-4 fighter (which costs about one eighth as much), not to mention the Soviet MIG-23 it is supposed to be matched against. As for its attack mission, Rep. Bruce Vento, chief congressional critic of the plane, says its range and payload are just slightly more than half that of the A-7E, which costs about 40 percent as much. In test runs on ground targets, the A-7E

scored much higher, and a proposed improvement, the A-7X (which would contain new engines) might do even better. The marine attack mission can be handled by the new, expensive, vertical-lift AV-8B.

Navy and marine personnel have been known to admit all of this when pressed (under Carter, the navy opposed the plane), but the administration is moving forward nonetheless with a plane so lavish it is now the single most costly nonstrategic weapon program in the budget. The A-7 is a better choice.

Budget authority savings FY 1983	**$1.4 billion**
Total program savings	**$20 billion**

3. Replace the F-14 Tomcat

One-on-one, this navy fighter can win "fly-offs" against the cheaper, less sophisticated F-5. But two-on-two or four-on-four or in other match-ups resembling real-world dog fights, the $30 million-per-copy F-14 often loses to the $4 million F-5. This astonishing result was proven again and again during tests conducted over the Nevada desert in the late 1970s. Computer studies before the tests had predicted that the F-14 could shoot down 74 less complicated fighters before being "killed" itself.

Nothing better conveys the limits of technologically advanced weapons and the standards by which they are built. What looks good on paper often doesn't work so well once circumstances get messy and unpredictable, as they tend to in war. The F-14s are worth having if only because their sophisticated "black boxes" make them somewhat effective at night or in fog. But a balanced naval air program would not build 24 more F-14s and eliminate F-4s altogether, as the

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navy has done for next year. The F-4, which is better than the F-5, has been upgraded with improved avionics. Twice as many of them could be bought for one fourth of the money proposed for more F-14s.

Budget authority savings FY 1983 $800 million
Total program savings $8.2 billion

4. Replace the F-15 Eagle

This is not a bad plane, but there is little point in buying 42 more of them next year, especially since the A-10, an effective close support aircraft, can perform many of the F-15's air-to-ground functions just as effectively and for a quarter of the price per plane. As an air force fighter, the F-15 is no better than the F-16, which costs half as much and needs so many fewer repairs that three of them can be available for flying for the cost of putting one F-15 in the air. Like other high technology planes, the F-15 spends a lot of time in the shop.

When it's in the air, the F-15 has one other mission: defense of the continental United States. But because the Soviets possess no significant intercontinental bomber force, this is defense against a nonexistent threat. Moreover, what interceptors we do possess have traditionally—and rightly—been cheap planes, the reason being that it doesn't take much to shoot down a bomber. The F-15, at nearly $35 million a crack, doesn't fill that bill.

Budget authority savings FY 1983 $1.3 billion
Total program savings $8.2 billion

5. Replace the AH-64 Attack Helicopter

As Gregg Easterbrook has shown *(The Washington Monthly,* September 1981), attack helicopters may be the worse weapons of all. The main reason the army has attack helicopters—1,000 of them—is the interservice rivalries that infest the Pentagon. The air force's A-10 airplane is half as expensive as the $15 milion AH-64 and performs air-to-ground attack functions better. But the air force won't let the army have it. That refusal is not because the air force likes its A-10; in fact, the typical distaste the USAF has for close-to-the-ground combat plus the fact that the slow, dependable A-10 is considered dull by pilots means that the plane has been given low priority.

As for the helicopters, they are impractical on land for anything but evacuation and transport. When it comes to attack they are deathtraps. "Every last one of them will be blown away in the first 30 minutes of an intense European battle," says Paul Hoven, a helicopter pilot with 1,500 flying hours in Vietnam. The army lost 10,000 during the war, many of them brought down by Viet Cong *rifle* fire. They are simply too vulnerable and delicate to play a meaningful role in battle. Investing in A-10 production and turning the plane over to the army would solve close support missions. But that would require shattering interservice rivalry that is so weakening the military.

Budget authority savings FY 1983 $500 million
Total Program savings $3 billion

6. Replace C-5 Air Transport

Sound familiar? Yes, this is the same Lockheed plane that in the early 1970s was revealed to have suffered $1 billion in cost overruns. After that, the wings cracked, and it took an additional $1.5 billion to fix them, part of which we're still paying for. But here the beast is again. Lockheed lost the transport competition to McDonnell Douglas but won the contract from the Pentagon anyway (according to *Aviation Week,* the reason you haven't heard McDonnell Douglas screaming much about it is that the air force greased the skids by offering new KC-10 orders). Meanwhile, the best option, converting Boeing's superb 747 to military use, was discarded despite the fact that Boeing was willing to deliver the plane at nearly half Lockheed's cost per plane and a sixth of the C-5's cost per mile.



The reason the Pentagon is seeking greater airlift is for the rapid deployment force, but this is a function the air force is not well-equipped to perform. With 100 new C-5s, it would still take 14 days to transport mechanized divisions to the Persian Gulf. Many members of Congress's "mili-

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tary reform caucus" suggest that RDF transport be handled by ship. That argument aside, any additional airlift for the RDF should be paid for by the people who have a real interest in securing Middle Eastern oil fields—our allies. (See sidebar by George Ott.)

Budget authority savings FY 1983 $860 million
Total program savings $6.6 billion

7. Cancel AWACs

Reagan wants to build six more—two this year—primarily for the defense of the continental United States. Given that the Soviet Union has little ability to stage an air attack against us, the surveillance and command planes are "strategically useless," as Senator David Durenberger puts it. But the dirty litle secret is that even where the idea of AWACs is appealing—in Europe and the Middle East—the planes don't work very well, especially when it comes to differentiating real from phony targets at lower altitudes. A former Pentagon engineer familiar with the plane says that the high-tech radar is so sensitive that Volkswagens on the autobahn showed up on the screen during NATO exercises. The Saudis may not know it yet, but the number of false alarms is reported to be very high, and tests held in the late 1970s over the Pacific west of Seattle showed the plane to be easily jammed by a U.S.-built EA-6B "Prowler" radar-jamming plane using equipment designed from a Soviet textbook. During the tests, two F-106s flew within a few hundred feet of the plane without being detected.

One reason AWACs are so popular abroad is that during demonstrations they have been able to keep track of an enormous number of planes at once. But it is not widely known that the exercises that left the Saudis and other potential customers drooling were conducted with a standard radar beacon system. Such a system requires the cooperation of the planes being tracked, an arrangement that isn't likely in a real battle. We don't need any more of these than we already have.

Budget authority savings FY 1983 $225 million
Total program savings $4.4 billion

8. Cheaper KC-135 Re-engining

The air force needs new fuel tankers, but it doesn't need new KC-10s *and* expensive new engines to upgrade the existing KC-135s. The best option, according to the congressional budget office, is to re-fit the KC-135s with existing Pratt and Whitney engines from Boeing 707s. This would satisfy all tanker requirements and save a bundle.

Budget authority saving FY 1983 $610 million
Total program savings $4.7 billion

9. Cancel the Seahawk LAMPS III Helicopter

This is a navy helicopter equipped with sensing devices and torpedos to seek out and attack submarines. At $39 million a crack (a 33-percent cost overrun) the LAMPS III is more expensive than the most elaborate of fighter airplanes, but internal navy studies reported by Senator Mark Hatfield have shown that its contribution to anti-submarine warfare is minor. Reliability for helicopters is always low, but none so low as this one. It will operate off destroyers, which are not equipped to provide the extensive helicopter maintenance that would be required. Soviet subs are a serious threat, so an anti-submarine capability should be a priority. But this isn't the way to get it.

Budget authority savings FY 1983 $2.1 billion
Total program savings $6.3 billion

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Army Vehicles and Guns

10. Replace the M-1 Tank

Widely considered the military's most notorious recent disaster, and rightly so. The Chrysler-built M-1 goes for about $2.7 million a copy, three times as much as the current standard tank, the far more reliable M-60. The M-1's main problem is with its "power-train," which consists of the engine and transmission. It seems the power train has trouble with a battlefield condition known as dust.

Some critics are upset by the fact that the tank weighs 60 tons (too heavy for many European bridges) and eats 3.8 gallons of gas per mile. But that wouldn't be so bad if it didn't break down so often. The army now admits that it can travel, on average, only 43 miles before requiring "essential maintenance" that takes an average of 2.6 hours. This negates the most important advantage the M-1 was supposed to have over its predecessor: high speed. Even though the tank can travel at 50 miles per hour, the repair problem means that its average speed over the course of 60 to 80 miles (*normal tank range*) is actually *lower* than that of the M-60.



Other problems noted by the Project on Military Procurement and others involve the gun stabilization system, which is so bad that American soldiers turned it off during contests with the British and West Germans, and the hydraulic fluid, which is far more flammable than its predecessors. Then there's the exhaust, which is so hot that it poses a fire hazard in dry woods and prevents troops from walking close behind the tank. At 1800 degrees, the exhaust provides a heat contrast that makes the M-1 an easy target for infra-red missiles.

The list goes on. The tank's new armor is better than its predecessors', but unlike theirs, it cannot be repaired in the field. What's more, the armor was revealed by the army earlier this year to be vulnerable to kinetic energy ammunition rounds possessed by the Soviets.

The army is now in a highly schizophrenic state over the M-1. Some brass have used the supposed Soviet ammunition capability (which cannot be blamed on Chrysler or the Pentagon) as a justification for a complete redesigning of the tank. That overhaul is reported to be underway already. But other generals go up to Capitol Hill and argue the tank is a gem just the way it is. Nobody knows exactly what is going on, except that there's $2 billion more in budget authority for next year. The current M-60 is cheap and dependable, and if the Pentagon replaced every M-1 ordered with two M-60s (for a total of 14,000), we would save billions and begin to erase the Soviet's tank superiority.

Budget authority savings FY 1983	**$700 million**
Total program savings	**$6.4 billion**

11. Replace the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle

For 20 years the army has been trying to come up with a new armored personnel carrier. This version is the worst one yet (see John Fialka's story, page 22). Assuming the army really does need more vehicles, the best option is to continue building the M-113, which costs one eighth as much. We could buy twice as many for one quarter the Bradley's price.

Budget authority savings FY 1983	**$750 million**
Total program savings	**$9.7 billion**

12. Replace the DIVAD Gun

This looks and operates like a tank but it's really an anti-aircraft gun—the most expensive in the world. Senator Hatfield, among others, has pointed to repeated tests showing that the DIVAD performs very poorly against moving targets. The reason this $10 million gun is such a failure is a classic case of misapplied technology—the automated radar fire control system that makes the DIVAD so expensive also tends to make it inferior to regular guns that rely on a soldier's eyeball. Shooting down a plane requires anticipating which direction it will turn, but radar, which is always *behind* the action, usually can track targets only if they are moving in a straight, predictable line, a maneuver that one might expect enemy pilots to avoid.

The high cost of the DIVAD means that comparatively few can be bought, which in turn means that the tanks (supposedly) depending on

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it for protection must cluster together more, making them juicier targets for enemy planes. If the army must have a new gun, there are several alternatives, among them a radar-less 35mm Swiss version that costs one thirtieth of the DIVAD. We could buy five times as many of the 35mm guns for a fraction of the price of the DIVADs.

Budget authority savings FY 1983 $595 million
Total program savings $3.7 billion

13. Cancel the Copperhead

A laser-guided cannon shell that is supposed to knock out tanks. Unfortunately, the laser doesn't work well in the presence of smoke or bad weather (the particles separate) and the "forward observer" beaming it onto the tank is almost always in a position to either knock out the tank without the help of a precision-guided shell or get killed before he can guide it. In tests last year at the Twenty-Nine Palms Marine Base, eight of 13 Copperhead rounds missed the tanks altogether. "It scares the hell out of me that we might have to go into combat with these gee-whiz weapons," one officer told the *Atlanta Constitution.*

Budget authority savings FY 1983 $187 million
Total program savings $1.6 billion

Naval Vessels

14. Replace Nimitz-Class Aircraft Carriers

The one Pentagon idea that is most destructive not only of the nation's economy but of its national security is the plan to build these three new Nimitz-class wide-deck carriers at $3.6 billion apiece. When fully equipped with fighters, cruisers, helicopters, and other supplies and escorts, the full price tag is estimated at $17 billion a carrier group. Senator William Proxmire, throwing in manpower and operations, says the figure should be more like $30 billion each, hastening to point out that the amount is in *current* dollars. The full cost by the time they are completed will be far beyond that.

Because ship-building takes a long time, the budgetary impact of these newly proposed carriers will not be felt right away. But that is all the more reason for Congress to focus on them now—before we are locked into an approach to naval defense that is guaranteed to keep the fleet small and vulnerable to the Soviets. The truth is that carriers would have little value in a big war. Asked during his farewell testimony before Congress how long one of these carriers could survive a war with the Russians, Admiral Hyman Rickover, who helped develop them, replied, "About two days." How could it be otherwise? Imagine a Soviet fighter pilot with visions of a red star dancing in his head. Just one of his $100,000 missiles might put a $4 billion carrier out of commission. It's the first thing he and his comrades would go for. Time after time, military experts, including supporters of the carriers, have used the same two words to describe them: sitting ducks.



So if carriers make no sense in all-out war, their only remaining use would be to impress and frighten Third World nations giving us trouble. This big-stick approach usually makes for unwise foreign policy, but in the rare event a "presence" were genuinely required, the carriers the navy now possesses would more than suffice. In fact, it's hard to think of a limited foreign entanglement where more than a few of the flattops would be called for. Since most defense planners agree a larger U.S. fleet is desirable, some of the money saved from canceling these carriers should be devoted to much smaller versions or to other vessels altogether.

Budget authority savings FY 1983 $4.8 billion
Total program savings $4.8 billion

15. Cancel Battleship Restoration

Reagan wants to show the flag not only in Cadillac-style carriers but in naval equivalents of a 1941 Pierce Arrow. In truth, of course, the destruction of battleships at Pearl Harbor may have been the greatest favor the Japanese ever did our navy. Even then, many people believed they were without practical use in war. The *Missouri,* one of the ships the administration wants to take

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The Bradley: Bells and Whistles

by John Fialka



On a warm summer day in 1980 the U.S. army rolled the Bradley Fighting Vehicle out for inspection at Fort Knox, Kentucky. The army's top armor commander, Major General Louis C. Wagner, numerous other dignitaries, and a local television crew were there to see a remarkable new troop carrier perform. The vehicle was designed to have the highway speeds of an M-1 tank, to fire on the move with its 25mm rapid-fire cannon and hit targets even in the dead of night, and to swim across rivers with the aid of a special rubberized nylon collar.

On this fateful day, soldiers arranged the special swimming collar around the top of the 25-ton Bradley, which then drove straight into the Ohio River—and sank.

This was not the first mishap for the Bradley in the 19 years since the army began looking for a new armored personnel carrier, and it probably won't be the last. What began as a relatively simple, "no risk" research and development venture in 1963 has evolved into the most expensive armored personnel carrier the world has ever seen, at roughly $1.9 million a copy.

The story of the Bradley—as pieced together with information from the army, from the vehicle's prime contractor, and from its friends and enemies in Washington—is worth pondering as Congress assesses Reagan's proposals to throw even more money into complicated weapons systems. The tale is a crazy quilt of indecision, constant hardware and design change, galloping price escalation, and a steady, seemingly mindless bureaucratic momentum that has let this $13 billion program roll over its critics time and again, even though their ranks have included a president and powerful committees on Capitol Hill.

The matter of choosing the ideal armored personnel carrier has always been difficult for the military because the vehicle is something of a bastard. It is not heavy or powerful enough to be a tank, yet it

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

must move into combat areas that would be lethal to an unarmored vehicle such as a truck.

The modern history of the carrier begins with the blitzkrieg tactic perfected during World War II by the German army, which used relatively simple, open vehicles. As one of the top German armor commanders in the war, General Hermann Balck, later explained, the real potency of the armored personnel carrier lay not in the vehicle itself but in the infantrymen it contained. The carriers traveled with the tanks until they ran into enemy anti-tank units. Then the infantrymen would leap out, deploy, and attack the enemy units.

Balck, who recently was interviewed by U.S. army and air force investigators, said he was against the more modern, closed versions of the personnel carriers because "you must be able to jump out immediately. If you are sitting enclosed in armor and have to exit through a door, there'll always be a few left inside."

Then there is the problem of mines. When an open troop carrier hits a mine, the troops are blown out of the vehicle and some, perhaps, will escape serious injury. When a closed troop carrier hits a mine, its occupants are blown up into the vehicle's armored roof.

Both the Soviet and the U.S. armies began fielding closed armored personnel carriers in the 1950s. One of the vehicles that emerged was the U.S. army's M-113, a sturdy, aluminum-armored box on tank treads that the normally understated military reference book, *Jane's Weapon Systems,* still calls "one of the most successful vehicles ever in the U.S. army service." It is made by the FMC Corporation.

Over 60,000 M-113s have been sold around the world, and they were used extensively in Vietnam. There the troops preferred to ride on top of the carriers, letting their feet hang down into the hatches. The Vietcong were using Soviet rocket-propelled grenades that cut through the M-113's thin armor, but it was possible to escape injury if you were sitting on top.

In 1967 the Soviet army fielded the BMP, which can carry 11 men into combat and features a pressurized interior to prevent intrusion by nuclear, chemical, or biological agents. The BMP is a versatile vehicle; it has a cannon, it can swim and be dropped by parachute.

Like other Soviet advances, the BMP sent U.S. army planners into a paroxysm of activity. Why didn't we already have an advanced armed carrier? Two previous efforts to develop a Mechanized Fighting Vehicle (MICV)—the first one begun in the early sixties—had failed.

So it was time to get cracking. FMC had designed several MICV prototypes, based heavily on the hardware of the M-113, but the army had rejected them. In the fall of 1972 the company sent the Pentagon a foot-high stack of documents and a wooden mockup of yet another vehicle with angled, laminated, aluminum armor and a small, one-man turret. It would cost $272,000. The army liked it and in November of that year FMC had a contract calling for production to begin by September 1976.

FMC, which was used to designing simple, workable machinery, figured on building most of the vehicle itself and delivering what the army wanted on time. What it was not used to was the so-called "bells and whistles syndrome," the tendency to bolt expensive, high-technology equipment onto relatively simple weapons—a practice perfected by the air force and nurtured by the aerospace industry.

Multi-Headed Monster

FMC was an $11 million company with expertise in building fruit-processing and canning

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equipment when in 1942 the Pentagon gave it a $200 million contract to produce a tracked, amphibious vehicle called the Water Buffalo. Within six months FMC produced the first one. By the end of the war the company had built 11,000, cranking them out with very little direction from Washington.

As one company official put it, FMC brought the same skills to the MICV project—expertise in metal bending, welding, and mechancial engineering. What had changed since the war was Washington. "What we're dealing with now is a multi-headed customer."

Several of the heads involved in the development of the Bradley were in the army. There was the Infantry Center at Fort Benning, Georgia, which wanted something to haul infantry into battle in a way that would allow them to fight from the vehicle. There was the U.S. Army Armor Center at Fort Knox, which wanted a heavy vehicle that could kill tanks. Then there was the light cavalry, which was in the process of developing a light, three-man armored scout vehicle, and thus resisted the MICV. Meanwhile, FMC had begun to deliver test vehicles to the army, but there were problems—a lot of them. To keep up with the new XM-1 tank in development, the MICV would have to travel faster than 30 miles per hour over uneven terrain without injuring its troops. According to FMC, the strain was such that the test rigs were continually throwing tracks and breaking their suspension systems.

The General Electric transmission that had been developed especially for the MICV refused to go more than 50 miles before breaking down. According to FMC, the transmission problem alone caused a two-year delay in the program.

Junked by Jimmy

By late 1975 it was clear that Washington was getting nervous. Nearly every other modern army in the world had an MICV and the National Security Council was toying with the idea of dropping the U.S. project and buying a West German vehicle called the Marder. The Marder was somewhat heavier than the MICV and cost around $400,000 a copy, but the NSC was lured by the fact that it was immediately available.

In the summer of 1976, as the testing continued to flounder (this time it was the MICV's 20mm gun that was malfunctioning), the secretary of the army, Martin R. Hoffmann, stopped everything. Army officials studying the results of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war had concluded that the MICV, as it stood, wasn't capable of operating on a battlefield against massed tanks.

A new high-level study group under Brigadier General Richard Larkin was formed, and in October 1976 it reported that there would have to be some major changes. The Larkin panel said the MICV should be refitted with two wire-guided TOW anti-tank missiles and a night vision system. It should have a stabilized 25mm cannon being developed by the Swiss, and with all that armament, it should have a two-man turret so the commander could sit up with the gunner.

The army considered these "bells and whistles" changes so impressive that in the spring of 1977 it changed the name of the program from MICV to the Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) and FMC was awarded a contract to build it. Based on MICV costs of $305,000 a copy, it was estimated the IFV would go for around $397,000.

By this time, skepticism was growing on Capitol Hill. The Senate Armed Services Committee was becoming openly critical of the vehicle. It invited a series of witnesses who said its aluminum armor was too thin and that it was too big: two-and-a-half feet taller than the M-1 tank and two-and-a-half feet taller than the Soviet BMP. "If it gets blown up because of sticking up there where everybody can see it, it does not make any difference how sophisticated its gun is or anything else," argued the Senate's chief critic, Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia.

While the Senate committee was threatening to cut the money for the IFV program, the House Armed Services Committee took a somewhat different approach. Although most members liked the IFV, they were angry enough about the army's delays to push through a law in 1977 ordering the secretary of the army to begin production no later than the middle of 1981.

"What we were saying," explained one House committee staff member, was, 'Army make up your goddamned mind.' The unrest on the Hill provoked the GAO—which had issued two earlier classified reports highly critical of the IFV—to publish a third report that called the vehicle too slow, too big, too complicated, too heavy, and too costly. "While the M-113 may be inadequate, the Infantry Fighting Vehicle, which is nearly four times as expensive, thus far has not shown to be much of an improvement," it said.

December 1977 was a cruel month for the IFV. Soon after the GAO report was released, the Office of Management and Budget raised another argument: The new two-man turret took up so much space on the IFV that its crew of infantrymen had to be cut from 11 men to nine. Moreover, now the

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driver, gunner, and the commander probably would have to stay with the vehicle on the battlefield, leaving it with a deployable infantry unit of six men—half that of the M-113. Since the original purpose had been to carry an infantry squad into battle, OMB concluded that it should be dropped altogether from the defense budget. Soon the IFV was moved from the defense budget's top priority list into a marginal area where the president could kill it if he wanted to. President Carter seized on the OMB argument and did just that.

Shocked by the suddenness of the attack on the IFV, General Bernard W. Rogers, then the army chief of staff, went to Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. Brown told Rogers he would not discuss it. The IFV, he said, was a dead issue.

But it wasn't. The following summer, softened by a heavy barrage of lobbying by FMC and the army, Congress slipped money for the IFV back into the defense authorization bill. That involved a great deal of back and forth, most of which was carried on at the committee staff level because Congress and the president were absorbed in a fight over whether or not to buy an aircraft carrier. "The members don't know shit about this vehicle," was the way one staffer involved in the bargaining over the IFV put it.

By November 1979 the price per vehicle had risen by $100,000 and the army's Operation Test and Evaluation Agency (OTEA) had filed a decidedly mixed report. It said that the IFV's night sight had image "flutter," that the electrical system often broke down, and that it did not appear the IFV could keep up with its companion, the M-1 tank, in battle. The soldiers used by OTEA had a rough time with the IFV's rubberized nylon swimming collar. Passing trees and brush scratched holes in it. In cold weather it sometimes froze into the stowed position and when the troops tried to pull it out, they made holes in it. Then when they applied the special rubber cement supplied by the army to patch the holes, the cement didn't work. The OTEA soldiers also discovered that it took 72 minutes to prepare the vehicle for airlift on a C-141 transport and another 81 minutes to load it. The side armor had to be unbolted and the vehicle then squashed down on its springs to make it shorter. Once that was done it couldn't roll, so it had to be winched on board. Finally OTEA pointed out that full ballistics tests had never been carried out on the IFV's aluminum armor.

None of this criticism really made much difference. The following month, December 1979, the army gave the go-ahead for full production.

Endorsed by Edwin

Perhaps the strangest thing that happened to the Bradley was revealed in December 1980 when the Defense department reported that the total cost for the program had risen from $7.4 billion to over $13 billion in *one year*. It turned out that the Carter administration, like its predecessors, tended to hide defense costs by projecting future inflation rates at five percent or thereabouts. Now inflation was approaching 15 percent. But that, as the army and FMC later explained, was responsible for only half of the increase. The other half involved further engineering changes and the need for more ammunition, spare parts, and exotic electronic repair equipment.

The House Appropriations Committee is still spinning around over that. In November 1980, shortly after the army again changed the name of the IFV to the Bradley Fighting Vehicle System, the committee ordered the army to perform more tests to match it aginst the M-113.

Heartened by this, the OMB decided to take another shot at the Bradley early this year, noting that for the price of one Bradley the government could buy eight improved versions of the trusty M-113. This argument eventually found its way to Edwin Meese, who rejected it.

As one frustrated OMB official noted: "The budget is an imperfect instrument for control over army programs. If one of the army's crown jewels is threatened, it absorbs the extra costs necessary to protect it and takes money out of something else, usually money for operations and maintenance or for readiness."

Meanwhile the Bradley, as it always has, rolls on. It is scheduled to reach U.S forces in West Germany sometime next year. The official army position is that there are no serious problems. "This vehicle," remarked one army spokesman, "is an infantryman's dream."

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out of mothballs, served no purpose in World War II beyond providing a place to sign surrender papers.

Battleships, as Captain Billy Mitchell told us in the 1920s, can be taken out of commission with a few well-placed bombs. And if the administration succeeds in putting cruise missiles aboard, a lot more will go down than the ships. "Reviving old battleships," says Barry Goldwater of the $2 billion plan, "is like trying to revitalize the army by digging up General Custer."

Budget authority saving FY 1983 $650 million
Total program savings $2 billion

16. Replace the Trident

The navy will build two more Washington Monument-length Tridents next year as part of its $30 billion program to put a third of our nuclear eggs in only a dozen underwater baskets. What makes more sense is to build a large number of conventional subs that could swarm the seas in such numbers that the Russians could never hope to locate all of our missiles. This strategy has a name, Shallow Underwater Mobile (SUM), and several different model subs could handle the task, including a West German submarine called the HDW-2000. For the cost of 12 Tridents, it is estimated that the navy could put 110 SUMS to sea carrying more than twice as many missiles. If we settled for half as many—55 SUMS—we could still field the same missile load as the Tridents. Meanwhile, the Russians would have to search for five times as many subs. Starting the conversion in 1983 would mean cutting Trident costs in half.

Budget authority savings FY $1.5 billion
Total program savings $15.1 billion

17. Replace SSN-688 Attack Submarines

At nearly $900 million each, these nuclear-powered subs are so expensive that they can't be bought in enough numbers to keep the Soviets guessing. Thanks to Hyman Rickover, the underwater navy is almost entirely nuclear now, but a concern about quantity suggests the U.S. should strike a balance by building larger numbers of cheaper diesel-electrics. The technology for diesel-electrics has advanced considerably in recent years. They are quieter and in some cases more maneuverable than nuclear subs. Three of them can be bought for the price of one SSN-

12 Weapons the Military Could Use

1. A light, maneuverable long-range bomber to replace the B-52.
2. Increased procurement of A-7 attack plane now used only by national guard.
3. Increased procurement of A-10 close support plane.
3. Renewed procurement of F-4 and F-5 fighters.
5. Small, diesel-powered submarines, both for attack and missile-launching capability.
6. Cheap, small "fast boats" that avoid radar.
7. 106mm recoilless (cannon) rifle for use as anti-tank weapon.
8. GAU-8 30mm cannon for use as anti-tank weapon.
9. Increased procurement of sidewinder missiles.
10. Battalion of motorcycles to improve maneuver warfare capability.
11. Increased procurement of Remote Piloted Vehicles (unmanned target locators and distractions for enemy anti-aircraft).
12. Small, light tank for the marines.

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688, and there are several fine European models to choose from while our shipbuilding industry converts some of its capacity back to diesel-electric in the post-Rickover age. Because small subs are an essential element of a flexible, surprise-oriented national defense, 80 percent of the $14.5 billion slated for attack subs in the years ahead should be spent. But it can be spread among far more submarines, a development the Russians are unlikely to appreciate.

Budget authority savings FY 1983	**$340 million**
Total program savings	**$2.9 billion**

18. Cancel the AEGIS Cruiser

At better than a billion dollars a pop, these air defense vessels cannot possibly be acquired in enough quantity to perform their mission—defense of aircraft carrier groups. This is true even if the navy doesn't go to large numbers of carriers. The navy, defying such logic, is asking for three AEGIS cruisers next year and 17 eventually. That will account for a sizable percentage of its budget for ships.

But there's another problem: the high-tech systems that make the AEGIS so outrageously expensive also make it highly vulnerable to attack. This is the great irony of advanced radar technology—it turns weapons into targets instead of shields. AEGIS will become the brightest target in the sea, allowing, according to Senator Gary Hart aide Bill Lind, radar homing missiles to lock on to it quite easily. A much better, and cheaper, idea would be to equip all naval vessels—from frigates to carriers—with their own anti-aircraft and anti-missile weapons. That way carriers would no longer be dependent on such expensive accessories.

Budget authority savings FY 1983	**$3 billion**
Total program savings	**$22.2 billion**

19. Cancel the MX Missile

In recent months, the MX has become an orphan. All of its possble basing modes—"Racetrack," "Big Bird," "Super-Hardened Silos"—have been abandoned by the Reagan administra-



The Washington Monthly Journalism Award

January 1982
is presented to
Peter Behr
The Washington Post

In a four-part series, Behr describes how short-term thinking bears a large share of the responsibility for the decline of American business in the last decade. Citing examples of how business leaders have foresaken research and investment in new plants in favor of acquistions and clean-hands business-school management, the author goes a long way toward explaining how American business is losing to foreign competition.

and to
Don Michak and **Paul Bush**
The Valley Advocate
Springfield, Massachusetts 01109

In "Cancer Coverup," Michak and Bush provide a detailed, careful examination of the tangled web of corporate neglect and regulatory laxity surrounding the discovery that scores of workers at a Springfield, Massachusetts chemical plant have died or are dying as a result of vinyl chloride poisoning.

The Washington Monthly wishes to recognize the writers and publishers who share our purpose of trying to describe how the political system really works, to determine why it succeeds, and why it fails, and to suggest ways in which it might be improved.

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tion for political or practical reasons. The best explanation for why the Pentagon has not gone ahead and figured out some way to deploy the things anyway is that the rationale for the missile in the first place—the so-called "window of vulnerability"—appears to have closed as quickly as it supposedly opened. In fact, for the last several months, not a peep has been heard from anyone in the administration about our land-based missiles being vulnerable to a first-strike or about our need for greater missile accuracy.

What killed this big 1980 campaign issue? The reality that total accuracy simply isn't possible for either side. The explanation has to do with something called "bias"—gravitational pulls and high altitude weather that can throw even the most advanced of missiles off course. Neither we nor the Soviets have ever tested ICBMs in the north-south trajectory they would travel during war, thus there's no way of being certain what effect the bias would have.

So our fear of Russian missile accuracy actually destroying all of our launching sites is not reasonable. (Because of our mobile submarine-launched missiles, it never really has been.) But in a larger sense, accuracy is not the real terror. The warheads may not be able to take out the men's room at the Kremlin or the Capitol, but the fear on the part of leaders that even the older missiles might—just might—come close has always been enough to assure deterrence. More missiles don't increase that effect much.

The "bias" point is finally becoming accepted in Washington, which means continued funding of the MX has nothing to do with building an accurate missile or defending against a first strike. It has everything to do with building a bargaining chip of dubious value and trying to back out of a bad situation gracefully, neither of which is worth $2.4 billion in outlays in 1983 alone.

Budget authority savings FY 1983 $4.4 billion
Total program savings Once $35 billion; no longer calculated

20. Cancel Ballistic Missile Defense System

This research and development program is a Trojan Horse for the return of the ABM (nowadays called BMD), which was defeated by Congress and banned in a treaty in the early 1970s. The ABM was not only strategically destabilizing but impractical. "It's like a civil servant," former Rep. Abner Mikva used to say. "It can't be fired and it doesn't work."

But Reagan and company apparently still believe a speeding bullet can stop another speeding bullet, and treaty or no treaty, they are pushing forward. Major General Grayson D. Tate Jr., manager of the BMD program, told the *Chicago Sun Times* that the army hopes to put "fly-along" minicomputers aboard the ABM interceptors. Before long the new missile will be procured and the country will be faced with a choice between canceling another multi-billion-dollar program and shattering forever the arms control agreements of the 1970s. Reagan should not be allowed to put us in that position, even at the R&D level, without loud and extended public debate. So far there hasn't been any.

Budget authority savings FY 1983 $917 million
Total program savings Still uncalculated, but in the tens of billions

21. Replace Phoenix and Sparrow Air-to-Air Missiles

Each Phoenix now goes for a numbing $2.2 million, which assures that pilots will get little practice firing them. Worse, in the 20 years the Pentagon has been trying to get the missile to work, it has never once been tested successfully under genuine war conditions. This gives many defense analysts reason for pause, because they

Nuclear Bombs and Warheads

The most deadly of all military weapons don't show up in the department of defense budget at all. The nuclear bombs and warheads attached to planes and missiles fall under the jurisdiction of the department of energy.

For 1983 the administration proposes a $5.5 billion budget for atomic energy defense programs (up from $3.7 billion in Carter's 1981 budget). More than 80 percent of that goes to the production of nuclear materials and weapons. The actual cost of each of these weapons is classified, but according to the Center for Defense Information, they are known to amount to about ten to 20 percent of the weapons system with which they work.

Reagan proposes that over the next ten years we add about 17,000 nuclear bombs and warheads to a current stockpile estimated by CDI to be about 26,000. Of that 17,000, only 6,500 will be replacements; the rest will be *additional* weapons, many of them, like their predecessors, containing 50 times the destructive power of the nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II.

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are unsure that the Phoenix's mission—hitting targets 100 miles away—is practical. The Phoenix is considered easy for the enemy to jam, and, because the enemy pilot can see it coming in a straight, predictable line, also easy to dodge.

Evidence that this type of missile doesn't perform well can be found in the experience of the Sparrow, which is similar to the Phoenix but used for shorter ranges. An earlier form of the Sparrow had a probability of kill in Vietnam of between .08 and .1. One reason is that for several seconds both before and after releasing precision-guided missiles of this kind the plane has to fly level. During the chaos of dog-fights, that can be difficult. A former defense official reports that the new Sparrow performed so poorly in operational tests last August that the tests were canceled. Production, unfortunately, wasn't.

The best strategy on missiles is to buy a lot of cheap ones in case some miss. And the best way to do that is to buy many more trusty Sidewinders, which cost less than one hundredth as much as Phoenixs and have already shown repeatedly that they perform well in war. Sidewinders, whose lack of complexity makes them unappealing to many Pentagon procurement officers, should be bought in twice their number for both air force and navy.

Budget authority savings FY 1983	**$266 million**
Total program savings	**$3.3 billion**

22. Cancel the HARM Air-to-Ground Missile

This one is supposed to attack ground radar facilities, but experience with a very similar missile in Vietnam suggests that the enemy can simply turn off its radar briefly to prevent the missile from homing in on it. On the off-chance that enemy ground forces neglect to turn off their scopes, the air force has more than enough of this type of missile stockpiled to lob one in every so often just to keep the other side's radar operators on edge.

Budget authority savings FY 1983	**$857 million**
Total program savings	**$2.1 billion**

OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE

Reagan proposes $70 billion in budget authority for the operations and maintenance account in fiscal year 1983—a hefty 11-percent increase from 1982. Yet contrary to prevailing perceptions, O&M hardly has been starved for funds in the past. During the 1970s this account grew faster than that for weapons procurement; since just 1978, O&M outlays have almost doubled.

Throughout this period, the number of ships, tanks, and planes to operate and maintain has steadily decreased. It's also worth recalling that during the last two decades the air force, for example, consciously neglected to purchase spare parts in the hope Congress would appropriate money to modernize its squadrons. One of the virtues frequently cited for these new aircraft was their lower maintenance costs.

So why does the O&M budget keep growing? Partly because bureaucrats in uniform play by the same rules as their civilian counterparts. Always try to increase your program's size and budget. If you have money left over at the end of the year, spend it or you'll lose it next year. Never, ever agree with a congressman that you could get by with less money.

Savings could be substantial if Congress applied some of the same scrutiny to this account that it does to those of far smaller agencies. In stark contrast to weapons, about 85 percent of budget authority reductions can be realized in outlays this year. "Total program savings" apply for FY 1983-87. Estimates, if anything are conservative.

23. Consolidate Depot Maintenance

No one wants tanks, ships, and planes sitting around idle waiting for spare parts and mechanics; after all, a grounded $35 million F-15 is as much use in an emergency as no F-15 at all. So anyone who dares suggest cuts in this account is usually accused of directly undermining "readiness."

Yet numerous studies—by the Pentagon, Congress, and the GAO—show large-scale inefficiencies and duplication of effort in this area. Individual services seldom share maintenance facilities, even for the identical plane or truck. A 1978 GAO report found that in the air force alone, excess capacity was costing up to $400 million a year. Since any "savings" a base commander makes often can be retained for other

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The Viper: Too Little, Too Light

By C. T. Hanson

By now you've been saturated with examples of the Pentagon's uncanny knack for taking a perfectly fine weapon and loading it down with so much expensive, complicated technology that it loses its value in combat. The saga of the army's Viper anti-tank weapon is slightly different. The Viper's predecessor, the bazooka, never worked well to begin with. So after decades of intensive research and testing, the army finally developed a replacement that is the paragon of simplicity: lightweight, inexpensive, and easy to fire. There's just one problem: it doesn't work very well either.

The Viper is essentially a bazooka in a throw-away launcher: one shot and you discard the launch tube. The army bills it as a weapon of last resort, for use by infantry troops confronting Soviet tanks at close quarters. The army is so enthusiastic about Viper—produced by General Dynamics—that it plans eventually to spend at least a billion dollars on the weapon, probably more.

But considering that it's supposed to pack far more punch than the weapon it's replacing, the Light Anti Tank Weapon (LAW), the Viper suffers from a peculiar disability. It seems that the weapon stands virtually no chance of knocking out a Soviet tank under most battlefield circumstances. The warhead is simply too small. According to a recent, still-classified Government Accounting Office report, the Viper cannot penetrate the front of modern Soviet tanks, a fact conceded by Charles Bernard, head of the Pentagon's land warfare division. "Given your preference, you'd kill a tank from the front," he says. But with Viper, Bernard admits American troops will have to let the Soviet tanks roll past them and try for more dangerous side and rear shots.

Will side and rear shots succeed? Only with extreme good fortune, according to the GAO. The Viper warhead might penetrate a tank's thinner side and rear armor, sending a jet of molten metal through the hole it punches. But since the warhead makes a hole about the diameter of a pencil, only a fortunate shot indeed—into ammunition or fuel—would cripple or destroy the tank. "The Viper offers a very poor chance of being an effective weapon," says Hyman Barras, a GAO land warfare specialist noted for the caution of his public statements, who oversaw the Viper investigation:

The Viper

Significantly, the Marine Corps agreed with Barras in official comments attached to the GAO report. Much of the bitterness between the two service branches stems from the Marine Corps's conviction that it often has been "stuck" with deficient equipment developed by the army. It does not want to get stuck with the Viper. The marines accordingly have urged Defense Secretary Weinberger to consider a real heresy: buy heavier but more effective anti-tank weapons from *foreigners* —the French, West Germans, or Israelis.

Of course, the army strongly defends its Viper program. "There are no outstanding technical problems with the Viper," it wrote in its own official comments to Congress attached to the GAO report, adding that in tests "there has never been an accidental firing of the Viper."

These exculpatory comments to Congress—in effect a defense of funding for Viper—were delivered in July. Yet a month later, a Pentagon agency called the Army Material Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) drafted a secret report listing a number of "technical problems" with the Viper, including accidental firings. Some rounds exploded in the launch tubes during test shots, and other accidental firings resulted from static electricity when the Viper was carried on helicopters, a common means of troop transport.

Then there's the small matter of cost. In 1976, the estimated cost for each Viper was $78. Today, with the weapon three years behind schedule, the army's

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estimate is $793, a cost overrun of over 1000 percent. Yet even if the Viper performed perfectly and still cost only $78, the weapon's overriding problem—the undersized warhead—would remain.

Why did the Army Ordnance Corps, the bureaucracy responsible for Viper, produce such a disastrously puny weapon despite its decades of experience developing anti-tank weapons? The answer is deeply imbedded in army thinking. For the past 40-odd years, the Ordnance Corps has pursued an *idee fixe* about infantry anti-tank weapons: they should be as light as possible and easy to transport. Both LAW and Viper are so light that any soldier can lug several of them around along with whatever other equipment he must carry.

But in its pursuit of lightness in weapons, the Ordnance Corps denied other important aspects of battlefield experience. Instead, it has created its own "bureaucratic experience" through a limited range of weapons tests. It relies heavily on computer simulations. It test-fires warheads into sheets of armor plating that supposedly represent a tank. Once in a great while it drains the fuel and removes the ammunition from a sacrificial armored relic,

LAW

which is duly shot full of test holes. Experts then study the tank's entrails to determine if a "kill" has been achieved.

However, not once since the outset of World War II has the Ordnance Corps tested one of its weapons against a tank fully loaded with fuel and ammunition, according to a Pentagon official. Charles Bernard says this is fine because such tests are costly, unnecessary, and would be only for "show." But among those who disagree is retired General James Gavin, the World War II airborne commander, who complained about the Ordnance Corps' bazooka in his autobiography, *On to Berlin:* "It could have been tested against German tanks captured in North Africa, but evidently was not."

Both the Viper and the LAW are the natural heirs to the World War II bazooka. Soldiers then were told the bazooka was "the greatest weapon ever devised," and after a day of blowing up plywood replicas of tanks on the practice field, it was hard to disagree. But once soldiers arrived in Europe to confront real tanks, they quickly learned to abandon their bazookas whenever possible in favor of the far more powerful *Panzerfaust*—the German version of the weapon.

The experience of a World War II private named Lenold Peterson suggests the difficulty his Viper-carrying counterpart might have today against Soviet tanks. Holding a bridge shortly after D-Day against a German counterattack led by a Tiger tank, Peterson grabbed a bazooka, ran within 20 yards of the Tiger, and fired five rockets into the tank turret. The shots scarcely made a dent. A sixth shot struck the tank tread, but the tank remained very much alive.

Peterson then ran forward to a position 15 feet behind the tank—practically point-blank range—and fired again. The rocket exploded harmlessly. Down to his last round, he fired again, and this time the round struck a vital spot and the tank exploded. Peterson won the Distinguished Service Cross for what army historian S.L.A. Marshall deemed this "unbelievably mad performance" in an account he wrote for *Armor* magazine.

But if World War II provided ample evidence to scrap the bazooka for a heavier weapon, five years later, when North Korea invaded the South, the standard infantry anti-tank weapon was still the bazooka. By the time Vietnam rolled around, the Ordnance Corps had developed the Light Anti Tank Weapon. And light it was: in the battle of Hue, a former Pentagon official recalls, it took between five and ten rounds from the LAW to knock out very thinly armored North Vietnamese tanks.

Now the LAW seems to be lingering even longer beyond its useful life than the ordinary bazooka. The army recently ordered another 100,000 copies of the LAW, and many probably will be distributed to U.S. troops in Europe, where the Soviet tanks are much more heavily armored than were those in Hue.

As the GAO report suggests, the Viper won't prove much better—which makes the army now 0 for 3 when it comes to infantry anti-tank weapons.

C. T. Hanson is a Washington writer.

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purposes, the incentives for budget-padding are enormous. So are the incentives for actual inefficiency. In 1980 the GAO concluded that by ignoring efficient management techniques and overestimating the number of incapacitated planes, the air force and navy were able to justify up to $6.9 billion-worth of unnecessary aircraft. Inefficient use of parts inventories is another problem; for example, the navy recently spent $5 million for new parts at the same time it had $11 million of surplus parts in another shipyard.

This part of the budget has grown at a feverish clip, from $6 billion in 1980 to $10.4 billion proposed for 1983. Often overlooked is that such a rapid increase is an implicit admission by the military that its weapons are far less reliable than earlier claimed. Substantial savings can be made by coordinating existing activities and ending inter-service duplication in this area—not to mention by building more reliable weapons.

Budget authority savings FY 1983 $500 million
Total program savings $5 billion

24. Reduce Administrative Overhead

Over one million non-uniformed civil servants now work for the department of defense, most of them in white-collar occupations. The $15 billion budgeted for their salaries comes from the O&M account. Almost 200,000 of them are clerical workers; 36,000 work in defense headquarter-type activities, or more than the entire work forces of the departments of labor, energy, and HUD combined. The department of defense also employs 1,500 civilian public information and public relations specialists and about 10,000 personnel managers.

At a time when other federal agencies are cutting administrative overhead, there's no reason the department of defense should be exempt. Yet the Pentagon is actually planning substantial increases in certain administrative accounts. For example, it wants to add five new assistant secretaries of defense and increase Weinberger's administrative budget by about 11 percent. (About $400,000 of the current budget goes to subsidize the secretary's private dining room.)

Last summer David Stockman identified $2.5 billion in potential savings through increased automation and a reduction in civilian administrative layering. What he *didn't* recommend was a freeze on salaries that are scheduled to go up five percent this year. We believe already high civil servant salaries, the current economic predicament, and low inflation justify a freeze of such salaries in all areas of government, including the department of defense. This will have little or no effect on military readiness. Add to that a reduction of four percent in civilian employment—less ambitious than Stockman's six percent—and savings are substantial.

Budget authority savings FY 1983 $2 billion
Total program savings $10 billion

25. Eliminate Subsidies for Military Commissaries and Exchanges

The original idea for these military grocery and department stores was to provide basic staples for poorly paid soldiers in remote locations. Not only are soldiers no longer poorly paid, but two thirds of the Pentagon's 375 commissaries are in the U.S. Most of the remainder are in Europe, and soldiers stationed there already receive additional compensation. Commissaries are subsidized directly by staffing them with government-paid employees. Exchanges are indirectly financed through government-defrayed maintenance work and transportation of goods. Except in remote locations, there's no reason soldiers and their families shouldn't pay the going rate for groceries and television sets.

Budget authority savings FY 1983 $500 million
Total program savings $3 billion

26. Eliminate Davis-Bacon and Service Contract Act Requirements

Much of the military's construction, maintenance, and repair work is performed by private contractors. These two laws require the military (and the rest of the government) to pay inflated "prevailing wage" rates that artificially jack up costs. For example, wages paid to workers at Georgia's Robins Air Force Base are based not on wages in nearby Macon, but on higher ones in distant Atlanta. Originally enacted in the 1930s to prevent unscrupulous contractors from paying shockingly low wages, these wage rules no longer serve any purpose (see "How Big Labor Brings Home the Bacon," February 1981).

Last year the Pentagon estimated elimination of these requirements would save five to 15 percent of costs a year. That suggests immediate savings of about ten percent are possible, especially since the current recession should lead to spirited bidding for these projects. For fiscal year 1983 the Pentagon has budgeted about $7.5

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billion-worth of contracts for domestic construction and repair and maintenance work. Of course, Congress should eliminate this requirement not just for the military, but for everyone.

Budget authority savings FY 1983 $750 million
Total program savings $5 billion

27. Reform the Military Health Care System

The military operates over 150 hospitals and outpatient clinics at an annual cost of about $5 billion a year. Yet many of these hospitals are located in areas woefully short of active duty soldiers. Denver's military hospital, for example, is 100 miles away from the nearest major base. Such facilities could be pared or closed down and their functions contracted out. Reagan advocates that the federal government close ten public hospitals because their occupancy rates are less than 80 percent; apply the same standard to military hospitals and 100 should close.

Dependents of active duty personnel, retirees, and *their* dependents—who represent over half the system's patients—should help defray the system's costs. It's only fair; those lucky enough to live near underutilized hospitals and clinics now get free care. Those who aren't so lucky, don't. A small $5 fee for each visit would net about $150 million a year.

Budget authority savings FY 1983 $500 million
Total program savings $2.5 billion

28. Reduce Expenditures for "Backlog"

"Backlog" refers to construction and repair projects that the services deem "necessary" but have been postponed for some reason. Some items, such as repairing decrepit barracks, are justified; others, such as reseeding the base golf course, are hardly high priority readiness items. Yet the military makes little effort to put a priority on projects, not only within services but between them. Nor do uniform standards exist for what "backlog" really is.

The best evidence that some of this backlog is of dubious merit comes from the Pentagon itself. Last spring Congress added $200 million to the Pentagon's 1982 budget request for backlog items. This spring the Pentagon presented a supplemental 1982 budget request that included $400 million *more* for backlog it hadn't felt was important a year ago. Sounds like a slush fund if there ever was one.

Congress needs to establish a logical system that first determines which backlog items deserve funding and then insures that money appropriated actually gets spent for them. Until then Reagan's proposed $3.7 billion request for real property maintenance—roughly a 15-percent increase over the 1982 request—should be carefully scrutinized to weed out low priority work. Immediate savings are possible by killing the 1982 supplemental request.

Budget authority savings FY 1982/83 $500 million
Total program savings $1 billion

29. Consolidate and Improve Military Base Operations

Many of the Pentagon's 1,200 military installations in the U.S. and abroad are remnants of a time when our force structure was far different. There's an Army Force Command Headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia, for instance, but that's about it: no barracks, no tanks, no troops. An in-house administration study shows at least 50 and possibly several hundred facilities could be closed with little effect on readiness, with savings in the range of several billion dollars a year. It's a politically sensitive area, of course, but if congressmen can cut money for social programs in their districts, there's no reason they can't accept closing unnecessary bases.

Short of closing, existing bases could be operated far more effectively. The GAO recently reported that up to $300 million a year could be saved just by combining maintenance contracts in areas containing more than one military facility.

Budget authority savings FY 1983 $1 billion
Total program savings $10 billion

30. Slow Ammunition Procurement Growth

In 1980 and 1981 the army, air force, and marines purchased about $4 billion-worth of new ammunition. Budget authority for 1982 and 1983 will total about $8 billion. This doubling of the procurement rate comes at a time when the current ammunition program is riddled with inefficiencies, duplication, and waste. Much ammunition is common to each service, yet each maintains too many separate stockpiles. Deferring to interservice rivalries, the Pentagon has yet to insist on centralized management for procurement and storage. A recent GAO report

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found that the navy often doesn't even know what kind of ammunition is in its own stockpiles, or its condition.

Without resolving these problems, a drastic increase in ammunition procurement (most of which will simply add to existing stockpiles), is asking for trouble. What's more, a steady buildup makes far more sense than turning production lines on full, only to turn them off again a few years later when the money gets tight. In wartime, restarting closed lines is much more difficult than expanding production on existing ones.

Shortages in certain ammunition stocks (particularly those used for training) can be covered by a steady growth of 20 percent in both FY 82 and FY 83. Future increases should be slowed as well.

Budget authority savings FY 1982/83	**$2 billion**
Total program savings	**$4 billion**

Personnel

In fiscal year 1983, the U.S. will spend more than $60 billion in salaries and pensions for active duty and retired military personnel. With the All Volunteer Force and a personnel system that encourages frequent movement and early retirement, the administration predicts these costs will continue to increase faster than inflation in the coming years.

Such a business-as-usual approach will waste money and decrease the effectiveness of our armed forces. The time is ripe for a wholesale restructuring of our personnel system that will reverse these trends.

31. Freeze the Number of Active Duty Personnel

It should be clear that the top priority for the military in coming years is insuring that it has effective weapons and the ability to respond quickly in an emergency. What isn't a priority is increasing the 2.1 million active duty force by 200,000 between now and 1987, as Weinberger proposes. No credible strategic rationale for this increase has been given. Most of the additional soldiers probably would end up based in the U.S., where about three quarters of the active force already is stationed.

If anything, the U.S. should consider reducing its active strength, relying more on well-trained

Three Modest Proposals

I. Forget the Persian Gulf

by George Ott

Jimmy Carter first nibbled at the idea, but it took Ronald Reagan to fall for it hook, line, and sinker. That idea is the Rapid Deployment Force —a quick-strike contingent of ships, planes, and 200,000 soldiers that will protect "vital U.S. interests" (read oil) in the Persian Gulf. Beefing up the RDF is one of the key principles behind Reagan's unprecedented peacetime military buildup. Starting costs for the force are estimated to exceed $20 billion; additional fighers, cargo planes, tanks, amphibious assault ships, and aircraft carriers Reagan authorizes for the Persian Gulf in the 1983 budget will cost at least that much.

A relatively small price, you say, to protect an important resource in a strategic region? Well, the truth is that the Persian Gulf isn't worth all the fuss. That's because the United States now gets a grand total of *eight percent* of its oil from the Middle East. That's no misprint. Most of our imported oil now comes from countries like Mexico, Venezuela, Indonesia, and Nigeria. While another Arab oil embargo would prove inconvenient, lower thermostats and longer gasoline lines are hardly the kinds of things that will bring America's economy to its knees.

Not so with our allies, who are heavily dependent on Middle Eastern oil. NATO countries get about half their oil from the Persian Gulf; Japan is dependent for about 75 percent. For them, any large-scale cut-off of Mideast oil would have devastating consequences.

So what are these countries doing to defend their "vital interests" in the Middle East? Not lifting a finger, actually. The Rapid Deployment Force is basically an all-American operation—paid for in full with American dollars.

It's not that America's allies can't afford to defend the Gulf. NATO and Japan combined contain twice as many people as the U.S. and a gross national product nearly 50 percent higher. But as long as the Pentagon seems spoiling so much for a fight, why should they insist on donating to the cause? Our prosperous allies didn't get that way by being stupid; they know a free ride when they see one.

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Our allies' selfishness, however, does contain a germ of common sense. Some amateur strategists contend that the Gulf's oil fields can be seized by American forces with relative ease. Perhaps. But what's often overlooked is that there's a big difference between occupying an oil field and being able to get the oil to its intended users. In Saudi Arabia, over 700 oil wells are scattered over a vast area, connected by a web of 7,000 miles of pipeline and 150 processing plants and pumping stations. Some inexpensive missiles, not to mention a few sticks of strategically placed dynamite, could knock the whole system out of commission for a lengthy period of time. The Iran-Iraq border war—a small skirmish compared to the superpower conflict envisioned by RDF planners—has brought Iran's oil production to a virtual standstill.

Seizing and attempting to control the Persian Gulf's oil might well be an exercise in futility. It would also be a logistical nightmare. The Russians could simply roll across their own border, pausing for lunch in Teheran before heading off to Baghdad. The United States would have to move 200,000 troops and their heavy equipment, much of it from 10,000 miles away. We would then have to keep our forces supplied during the prolonged conflict—assuming, of course, it didn't escalate into nuclear war.

Logistics aside, there are also the overwhelming difficulties of waging war in a desert environment. In the recent military exercise in Egypt labeled Bright Star I, our troops learned that the fine desert sand is a major enemy. It erodes the tips and edges of helicopter blades, jams rifles and machine guns, and causes combat boots to dry up and crack. Even so, the biggest problem for the RDF may not prove to be sand, but water. Still unanswered is how the RDF will obtain the five million gallons of fresh water it needs daily to slake the thirst of its sophisticated machines and weary soldiers.

All the allies certainly have a stake in preventing Soviet expansion in the Persian Gulf. But the logic behind the RDF—and why Americans should pay for it—breaks down when it comes to oil. It's especially baffling when one considers that increased reliance on Mexico could eliminate our use of Arab oil altogether.

Protecting the large U.S. investments in the area partially accounts for the RDF. The Arabian American Oil Company certainly wants us to stay. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has $24 billion-worth of construction projects to protect. And the U.S. weapons makers' interest in the Saudi Arabia connection is illustrated by the $34 billion they've made in arms sales since 1973.

But most important, the RDF can be explained as a continuation of the long-standing U.S. tradition of being a sucker for its friends. Almost half our yearly defense budget goes to defend our NATO allies and Japan. Yet while we pay six percent of our GNP, much of it for someone else's protection, Germany pays just 3.5 percent, and Japan pays less than one percent.

As far as the Pentagon is concerned, however, it's still full speed ahead with the RDF. In the meantime our allies can continue spending their money on making better television sets, computers, and automobiles, while we spend ours protecting *their* oil.

George Ott writes frequently for military periodicals.

II. Draft the Rich

By now it should be apparent that the All Volunteer Force is working about as well as some of the weapons mentioned above. The time has come to revive the draft.

Pentagon planners like to point out that last year they met their recruiting goals with enlistees of improved quality. What they don't like to mention is the major reason for these gains: the worst economic recession since the 1930s. If the economy ever revives, the recruiting problems will return, particularly since the natural recruiting pool of 15- to 21-year-olds will decline 15 percent by 1990.

But a far more basic problem with the AVF is its very premise: most Americans need never have direct contact with military life. The AVF ensures that, as in Vietnam, soldiers will come largely from the lower classes, what we call the "Let Them Hillbillies Go Get Shot" Factor (see "Draft the Rich" in the April 1980 issue of *The Washington Monthly*).

The chances of reckless military adventurism abroad will be reduced by the establishment of a draft. One of the main reasons the war in Vietnam lasted so long was that so few children of national leaders had to fight (only one member of Congress lost a son). The real justification for going to war would be examined much more quickly under a fair draft system.

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The draft would also save money. The military's current $1 billion recruiting and advertising budget could be reduced drastically; savings would more than cover the administrative expenses of operating the system. Volunteer draft boards already are being established throughout the country under Carter's registration program. Salary levels for enlistees could be reduced; rather than $500 a month, conscripts could manage on $275, since room and board is free. If that happened, officers would no longer have to be paid so much to maintain salary superiority over enlistees.

The simplest version of the draft would be to choose young people by lottery. Under current requirements, about one in four would be called. Exemptions should be strictly limited. Based on about 400,000 enlistees a year, annual savings could easily exceed $5 billion. But the most important benefit can't be measured in dollars and cents. It has to do with making the defense of the nation something none of us can ignore.

III. Get Out of Europe

After leaving the White House, Eisenhower observed, "For eight years [there] I believed... that a reduction of American strength in Europe should be initiated as soon as the European economies were restored. I believe the time has now come to start withdrawing some of those troops."

That was 20 years ago and nothing has changed. Last year Pentagon officials testified that about half the defense budget—more than $100 billion—is directly or indirectly linked to Europe's protection. While many of the European economies today are even more robust than our own, almost 350,000 American soldiers remain stationed on the continent. That's almost as many as when Eisenhower spoke those words in 1963.

The world has changed a lot since then. The Soviet Union now seems far more interested in seeking military advantages in Africa and Asia than in Europe. European nations are increasingly reconciled to co-existence with the Soviet Union; the recent natural gas pipeline agreement, which has caused so much consternation in the Reagan administration, is only one reflection of that. Sentiment is strong and growing in Europe against allowing more nuclear weapons on the continent, such as the Pershing II missiles, which Reagan officials contend are crucial to European defense.

Of course the U.S. has a vital interest in the security of Western Europe. But the strategic rationale for such a large American force there always has been tenuous. Few military strategists believe the NATO allies could stop a concerted Warsaw Pact assault. Instead, the main function of our troops is to serve as a nuclear "tripwire." The theory is that the spilling of American blood on European soil will inevitably mean global nuclear war; knowing that, the Russians will be deterred from such folly.

Is such a large tripwire necessary? Not at all. Only if a future European conflict could be confined to a conventional war would these troops be of much use. But even accepting that highly dubious assumption, there's the additional question of who should pay for that tripwire. The U.S. now spends far more of its GNP on defense than the NATO allies do to defend not only their territory but also their major source of oil: the Persian Gulf.

Reducing our NATO commitment doubtless would displease our allies. Our troops there contribute billions to their economies. A force reduction also might disappoint American officers and enlisted men for whom a European duty tour is an interesting diversion. But these are slim reeds indeed on which to rest such a massive expenditure.

A decade ago an amendment sponsored by Senators Hubert Humphrey and Harry F. Byrd Jr. to bring home 110,000 troops from Europe passed the Senate 73-14, only to die at the hands of a fierce lobbying campaign by the Nixon administration. Such a reduction makes even more sense today. A complete withdrawal over several years also makes sense. Savings just from a 110,000 force reduction are substantial; more than $2 billion in salaries is involved, not to mention costs associated with travel, training, operations and maintenance, fuel, administrative overhead, and providing for soldiers' families.

Just as the Reagan administration has so theatrically insisted on letting Poland be Poland, it's time to let Europe be Europe—especially when it comes to paying for its own defense.

—The Editors

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reserve units and withdrawing troops from strategically dubious locations. Not only do most of our allies have much smaller active duty forces, but they pay soldiers far less by conscripting them.

Cuts should begin immediately: 57,000 additional troops are projected for 1982 and 1983.

Budget authority savings FY 1982/1983 $1 billion
Total program savings $10 billion

32. Reduce the Size of the Officer Corps

Today there are eight times as many admirals per ship as there were at the end of World War II and seven times as many air force generals per plane. For every 12 lieutenant colonels there's one combat command; for every ship, 12 potential captains. A typical officer retiring after 25 years will have spent only one third his time in an officially designated "combat post," and two thirds of *that* time will have been spent in the United States. Fully one third of the military's career officers will be largely desk-bound in noncombat jobs for their entire careers.

While the World War II ratio is unrealistic in peacetime, the 1964 standard of seven enlisted men to one officer seems reasonable, especially since there are far fewer planes, ships, and tanks today. Adhering to this ratio would reduce the current 290,000-person officer corps to 260,000. Yet the Pentagon actually has worsened the problem by incresing the number of ROTC scholarships, some of which cost the government more than $10,000 a year, from 80,000 to 110,000 since 1979. And between 1981 and 1983 Reagan projects the number of officers will grow at nearly twice the rate as enlisted men. Congress should cut the scholarships immediately; reducing the number of officers through attrition will take several years.

Budget authority savings FY 1983 $250 million
Total program savings $2.5 billion

33. Reduce Permanent Change of Station Travel

For 1983, Reagan proposes to spend $3.1 billion to move soldiers from one base to another. That doesn't include over $100 million for luggage and furniture damaged in the process. Last year there were more than one million moves in a total force of 2.1 million. Rep. Pat Schroeder estimates that at any given moment, one in five soldiers is on his way somewhere else.

Such peripatetic behavior costs even more than these figures suggest. Extra personnel must be retained to fill in for those on the move. Men in new posts must undergo constant retraining; between flying hours, steaming hours, land operations, and classroom instruction, training is a $15 billion item. "The military has a very shallow institutional memory," observes one army general, who notes that just as officers begin mastering their job, another order to move often arrives. "In more than 30 years my longest tour of duty was my last—four years and one month."

This sytem actually undermines morale and readiness. Many good officers, forced to uproot their families every couple of years, simply leave because of the hardships. Enlisted men who are strangers to one another don't develop the cohesion and camaraderie that might prove decisive in combat.

The army currently is working on a rotation system based on moving units rather than individuals—a sensibile approach over the long run. For now, simply extending the tours of duty by about four months would reduce expenditures by about $750 million, according to Rep. Les Aspin. By reducing training costs, lowering manpower needs, and improving efficiency, long term savings should be far more substantial.

Budget authority savings FY 1983 $750 million
Total program savings $10 billion

34. Reform the Military Pay System

A typical recruit now receives free room and board and about $550 a month. Some get enlistment bonuses of up to $5,000 while many get special allowances for various types of duty. Officers' compensation also is generous. Between his salary and various tax-exempt allowances, a 40-year-old lieutenant colonel working at the Pentagon can *net* an income of more than $35,000—that's the equivalent of a civilian's $60,000 salary.

Military personnel understandably are somewhat defensive about such generous pay levels. During the last decade much of the nation's intelligentsia has developed a studied scorn for military matters and people. "There's been a basic image popular in America," observes one retired general, "that the military is bad for you, that it makes you mean or makes you a killer." The caricature of the mercenary or bumbling soldier is all too prevalent; often ignored is the fact that most professional soldiers deeply hope

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they'll never have to use in war the skills they've been taught. Unfortunately, with military life transformed from a once-respected duty into an unpopular job, it's been easy for soldiers to rationalize that society should pay a premium price for their services.

Attitudes are slowly improving on both sides. But meanwhile, salaries continue to escalate as the military clings to a compensation system that tends to "level up" everyone's salary to pay for a few highly trained personnel. Enlisted men who drive trucks and those of the same rank who are computer specialists get the same salary, although there's a surplus of the former and a shortage of the latter. And while it insists that "equal pay for equal rank" is necessary to preserve morale, the military then breaks its own standard by paying re-enlistment bonuses of up to $20,000 for certain skills.

The "level up" system, combined with a volunteer force for which pay is a primary recruiting device, makes large pay raises inevitable. Last October's 14.3 percent hike cost a hefty $4.5 billion; since October 1979 salaries have risen 32 percent. Reagan's budget continues this pattern of wage hikes outstripping inflation.

A system that pays people for their actual skills can prevent the nation from spending far more than necessary for its military manpower. As a first step toward such a system, Reagan's proposed eight percent raise for 1983 should be eliminated, and some of the savings used to begin paying the market rate for needed specialists. Future pay raises should be scaled down.

Budget authority savings FY 1983	**$3 billion**
Total program savings	**$20 billion**

35. Reform the Retirement System

This year pay for retired military personnel will consume $16.5 bilion, compared to just $1.9 billion in 1965. The nation now spends more money each year on its former soldiers than it does training active duty personnel.

Few changes are as important as the wholesale restructuring of the military retirement system. The current system adheres to the "up and out" principle, whose major characteristics are constant movement and early retirement. The military grooms each of its officers to be a future head of the joint chiefs of staff, as adept at leading troops into battle as mastering the intricacies of interoffice Pentagon politics. Most never even get close, not for lack of merit but for a shortage of top command posts.

So after a career of shuttling from one post to another every two or three years, these people are encouraged—or required—to leave the service by a generous retirement system that pays them half their salary after 20 years' service and provides subsidized medical care for themselves and their dependents. Many retirees aren't even 40 years old when they leave to start second careers with a $15,000 pension. Some retirees never leave the Pentagon's employ. A 1981 GAO report on the department of defense's $3 billion-a-year consulting business found over half its contracts involved former employees. More striking, fully 40 percent of the consulting contracts awarded were *unsolicited.*

The rigors of military life that once might have justified such a system have long since vanished. And what little is gained in "youth and vigor" is more than lost in experience and talent. None other than General David Jones, departing head of the joint chiefs of staff, recently remarked, "In our system [the famous military theoretician] Clausewitz would probably make full colonel, retire at 20 years, and go to work for a think-tank."

As with high pay, military personnel have come to expect generous retirement benefits. And with many servicemen now counting on retiring early, any immediate changes in this sytem will be doubly difficult.

A reasonable plan would allow those now with 18 or more years' service to continue to retire after 20 years' service with one stipulation: they forego annual cost-of-living raises until they retire permanently from the work force. The same would apply to current retirees who don't rely on their pensions as a main source of income. For those more than two years away from retirement, the minimum requirement would gradually increase until those who now have ten years of service or less could leave with full benefits only after 30 years or at age 55. This system would still be more generous than most private pension plans.

Immediate savings would be small but would increase steadily in future years. The "total program savings" listed below are only through 1987; even larger amounts would be realized later. Far more important, of course, are the intangible benefits of keeping people who are at the heights of their abilities in the military rather than losing them.

Budget authority savings FY 1983	**$750 million**
Total program savings	**$5 billion**

□

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

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

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THE D.C.A.T.

by Gregg Easterbrook

Because of the increasing demand for jobs in Washington, the Arbitrary Testing Service (ATS) of Princeton, New Jersey, has decided to initiate a new examination, the D.C.A.T. Similar in form and content to the S.A.T. and L.S.A.T. , the D.C.A.T. will govern admission to all employment on Capitol Hill and in the White House and federal agencies; in the Washington press corps; and in Washington law, lobbying, and consulting firms.

Students should take the D.C.A.T. during the first semester of their final year in graduate school. Only master's and Ph.D. candidates will be permitted to take the examination. No one without advanced academic credentials, no matter how capable, will be allowed to take the D.C.A.T. or be allowed within the District of Columbia boundaries for any reason other than tourism.

Here is a sample D.C.A.T. examination. DO NOT begin the examination until your instructor has bored you with at least 15 minutes of superfluous directions. DO NOT pick up your pencil until the atomic clock at the U.S. Naval Observatory has been set to time you. USE ONLY A NUMBER TWO PENCIL. You MAY NOT use a Number One pencil, a Number 87 pencil, a felt-tip marker, or a gold-plated Cross pen (no matter who gave it to you).

NOTE: If your last name ends in a Roman numeral, you may elect to skip this examination and be admitted to Washington directly under terms of the Genetic Inbreeding Preservation Act. Ask your trust fund officer for details.

Gregg Easterbrook is a staff writer for The Atlantic *and a contributing editor of* The Washington Monthly.

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THE EXAMINATION IS ABOUT TO BEGIN.
REMEMBER, YOUR ENTIRE LIFE DEPENDS ON HOW YOU ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS.
BUT DON'T LET THAT MAKE YOU NERVOUS.

READING COMPREHENSION

1. Below is a passage from the *Federal Register*. Choose the sentence that most nearly expresses its meaning:
"Preliminary Draft Notice: Pursuant to Title XXXVI of the Airport Reforestation Act, all personnel not specifically excluded will henceforth, in accordance with circular AA/2-0778 and not to exceed future determinations, await publication of further instructions."
   (A) All applicable procedures, except those not applicable, are no longer applicable.
   (B) Future Subsection-D waiver requests must be routed through the Office of Simultaneous Non-Compliance.
   (C) In case of fire, break your glasses.
   (D) Post communem considerationem de virtutibus et vitiis aliis ad materiam moralem pertinentibus, necesse est considerare singula in speciali.

2. Below is a statement recently made by Alexander Haig at a press conference. Choose the sentence that most nearly expresses its meaning:
"To context your interrogative, I must adduce, if you will, a certain amplitudinality vis a vis the time frame which inhibits, indeed excoriates, relevant factors."
   (A) Damn, sure wasn't expecting *that* question.
   (B) If he thinks I'm going to respond, he's crazy.
   (C) How come if I'm powerful enough to destroy the world, I can't screen the reporters they let in to these things?
   (D) To adduce your amplitudinality, I must context, indeed excoriate, vis a vis the inhibiting time frame, certain relevant factors. If you will.

3. Below is a passage from the *Commerce Business Daily*. Choose the sentence that most nearly expresses its meaning:
"Call for Bids: Auxiliary power unit, 280 SAE output, 5,000-hour life, 110 kg. maximum weight, for KC10 tanker aircraft. Specs on request. Proposals due May 30."
   (A) Better make campaign contributions to all members of armed services committees.
   (B) Better invite some Air Force purchasing officers to the company hunting lodge for technical consultation.
   (C) Better have engineering design a smaller, cheaper, more reliable unit which will improve KC10 performance.
   (D) Sorry, the fix is in. Specifications are identical to an existing Westinghouse motor.

S T O P

IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED (C) TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, *DO NOT* TURN THE PAGE. *DO NOT* CONTINUE THE EXAMINATION. PUT DOWN YOUR PENCIL AND IMMEDIATELY BOARD A PLANE FOR ELKHART, INDIANA.

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VOCABULARY

4. "Gross equivalent throw weight" means:
   (A) Reelection for congressmen with defense contractors in their districts.
   (B) Continued prominence for Norman Podhoretz.
   (C) Nothing if the weapons are ever actually used.
   (D) Nothing in particular. Definition varies according to the status of Pentagon budget requests.

5. "Seasonally adjusted" means:
   (A) In winter we drink whisky, in summer G&Ts.
   (B) People don't mind being unemployed as long as it's warm out.
   (C) People don't mind being unemployed as long as economists predicted it.
   (D) If it's an election year, somehow the figures will look much better.

6. "Misstatement" means:
   (A) Misleading misquotation of misinformation.
   (B) A victimless lie.
   (C) An inadvertent slip of the tongue when I do it, a shocking abuse of public trust when someone else does it.
   (D) Any statistic quoted by Ronald Reagan.

7. "RIF" means:
   (A) Instead of reporting to an agency every day, federal employees report to the Merit Systems Protection Board to work on their appeals. Otherwise nothing changes.
   (B) Finally, federal employees get the chance to take one of those much-higher-paying jobs they always claim are waiting in private enterprise.
   (C) A guitar or saxophone solo.
   (D) Too many bureaucrats chasing too few slots.

8. (BONUS QUESTION) "Merit protection" means:
   (A) Protection for people who lack merit.

WASHINGTON SOCIAL MORES

9. Adrian and Leslie, two corporate lawyers, meet at a Georgetown party. They begin chatting about merger prospects for their multinational clients. Suddenly Adrian breaks off the conversation, saying "Let's have lunch." Leslie should conclude that:
   (A) Adrian felt further discussion would compromise their professional ethics.
   (B) Adrian was bored, but nobody at Washington parties will admit that.
   (C) Adrian was proposing an affair.
   (D) Adrian was hungry.

10. Later Adrian and Leslie do decide to have lunch. What time should they arrive at the restaurant?
   (A) 11:30, so everyone will know they plan to eat briskly and hurry back to the office for more important work.
   (B) 12:15, so the maitre d' can make a spectacle of whisking them to their table ahead of a long line of diners who arrived earlier.
   (C) 1:00, so they can circulate among lawyers and lobbyists at other tables, generating merger rumors that spark wild market fluctuations.
   (D) 2:00, so it is clear they have no intention of returning to the office, but of going straight to a hotel.

GO ON TO THE NEXT PAGE

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11. At the hotel, a conflict arises. Leslie wants to be tied up in red tape and beaten with a leather diplomatic pouch. Adrian wants to dress as a Secret Service agent and do a striptease to "Hail to the Chief." Should they:
    (A) Indulge each other's fantasies in turn.
    (B) Act out one fantasy today, and the other at a later date.
    (C) Ask a congressman to join them.
    (D) Videotape the entire session.

12. In the above questions, Adrian and Leslie are:
    (A) Both female.
    (B) Both male.
    (C) Heterosexual, if you can believe that.
    (D) Related.

ETIQUETTE

13. While Lester, a foreign service officer, is attending a state dinner in Bangala, a native waiter spills a tray. The Bangalian official seated to Lester's right pulls a gun and shoots the waiter. Lester should:
    (A) Do nothing. At formal dinners, you are responsible only to the person seated on your left.
    (B) Grovel profusely, saying Western colonial imperialism is to blame for all Third World problems.
    (C) Casually ask, "What's all the fuss about? It was only a servant."
    (D) Call in an air strike.

14. What is the best way to meet the right kind of people in Washington?
    (To meet women):
    (A) Stand in the hallway of any congressional office building and call, "Hey Jennifer!"
    (B) When introduced at parties say, "Yeah baby, I'm an investigative reporter, but I don't like to talk about it."
    (To meet men):
    (A) Stand in the hallway of any congressional office building and call, "Hey Blair!"
    (B) When introduced at parties say, "Yes, I'm an investigative reporter, but I also studied abroad, read Aeschylus in the original, and perform weekends with American Ballet Theatre."

ECONOMICS

15. On a Washington street, Fred encounters a crippled woman holding an emaciated child. She asks for a dollar. Fred should:
    (A) Give her nothing, because handouts will only prevent her from taking one of the many aerospace engineering jobs listed in the Sunday want ads.
    (B) Give her the dollar, and advise her to invest it in a steel plant.
    (C) Give her the dollar, then go on national television to proclaim that private charity is more responsive than government programs.
    (D) Break her cane, steal her purse and squirt the kid in the face with ketchup.

16. Supply-side economics holds that the poor have too much money, while the rich don't have enough. It also holds that large tax cuts, increased defense spending and budget balancing are not mutually contradictory. What are other important elements of supply-side theory?
    (A) Placing teeth under the pillow is an effective capital-formation strategy.
    (B) Copper bracelets cure arthritis.
    (C) If everyone claps his hands, Tinkerbell will fly again.
    (D) You can travel to Kansas by repeating the words, "There's no place like home."

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

17. Diane has $500,000 worth of stock that pays $37,500 in dividends annually. In order to shelter those dividends, she should:
    (A) Reinvest all her assets in pre-Columbian daggers and Urdu wall hangings, declare a loss, buy orange juice futures on margin, sell Cincinnati Milacron short, then form a holding company.
    (B) Have her tennis court classified as a place of business.
    (C) Borrow $250,000 from her broker at 15%, giving her $37,500 in interest payments, which (being deductible) offset the stock dividends. Then use the loan to buy a single-payment annuity at 12%, generating a $30,000 annual return which is tax-exempt until Diane actually collects the money many years later. Meanwhile, borrow further against the value of the annuity.
    (D) Hire a prestigious accounting firm and let them figure it out.

18. Based on the above Federal Reserve Board graph, what would you predict?
    (A) Sluggish growth through the third quarter of the second trimester, followed by a counter-cyclical turndown and a reverse upward trend.
    (B) Real growth will decline, but fake growth is almost as good.
    (C) Overall employment will fall, but jobs for economists will be plentiful.
    (D) Murray Weidenbaum will say that prosperity is just around the corner.

GO ON TO THE NEXT PAGE

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PUBLIC RELATIONS

19. Marjorie is Rep. Blanton Foghorn's press secretary. The FBI videotapes Foghorn committing a bizarre act of self-fenestration. When the press calls, Marjorie should:
    (A) Lie, but feel guilty later.
    (B) Lie shamelessly.
    (C) Lie only in direct response to questions, volunteering no additional lies of her own.
    (D) Note that 12-year-old twins are notoriously unreliable witnesses.

20. Steve is an Army press officer. A GAO report discloses that the AH-409 Godzilla helicopter program is running 350% over budget. When the press calls, Steve should:
    (A) Lie, but feel guilty later.
    (B) Lie shamelessly.
    (C) Lie only in direct response to questions, volunteering no additional lies of his own.
    (D) Note that anything to replace this program would be even worse.

21. Phillip is a senatorial candidate. In his official biography he claims to have been a general during the Vietnam, Korean, and Crimean wars; to be able to swim the English Channel in under 20 minutes; to have cured cancer; to have read *and* understood *Gravity's Rainbow*. Later his statements are revealed to be fraudulent. Phillip should:
    (A) Stand by his story and show as proof a recent profile of himself in *The New York Times Magazine*.
    (B) Claim he was merely conducting his own investigation of the Congressional Directory.
    (C) Confess all in an exclusive interview with Janet Cooke.
    (D) Note that this is nothing compared to what goes on in Congress and at the Pentagon.

22. During the Nixon administration, Norman was a special assistant to the acting deputy director of the Farm Credit Administration. A friend of someone he met in a bar told him a mildly plausible anecdote about Nixon, Egil Krogh, and a late-night request for dental floss. Norman receives a contract to write a book about it. He should title the book:
    (A) *In the General Vicinity of Power.*
    (B) *Hearsay to History.*
    (C) *Tapes and Teeth: I was Nixon's Dentist.*
    (D) *A Thousand Seconds.*

WORD ASSOCIATIONS

In questions 23 through 27, find the word that *does not* belong:

23. (A) administration
    (B) authority
    (C) Republican
    (D) influential
    (E) Negro

24. (A) Harvard
    (B) academy
    (C) father
    (D) endowment
    (E) rejection

25. (A) Pentagon
    (B) expensive
    (C) complex
    (D) sophisticated
    (E) defense

26. (A) townhouse
    (B) sailboat
    (C) roadster
    (D) wardrobe
    (E) children

27. (A) Japan
    (B) interview
    (C) watches
    (D) cash
    (E) coincidence

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ANALOGIES

28. "Congress" is to "progress" as:
    (A) "Dam" is to "river."
    (B) "Anchor" is to "ship."
    (C) "Tackle" is to "fullback."
    (D) "Whoa" is to "horse."

29. "Efficiency" is to "bureacracy" as:
    (A) "Speed" is to "postman."
    (B) "Courtesy" is to "Amtrak"
    (C) "Penurious" is to "Pentagon."
    (D) "Intelligent" is to "intelligence."

30. "Lawyer" is to "justice" as:
    (A) "Porpoise" is to "tractor."
    (B) "Flashlight" is to "waterfall."
    (C) "Toaster" is to "arbitration."
    (D) "Sneaker" is to "Czechoslovakia."

MILITARY AFFAIRS

31. Suppose, now just suppose, you are in the service. While on maneuvers near Libya, your F-14 fighter locks on to and simultaneously tracks 20 different geese. You launch six $2-million each Phoenix missiles to attack them. By the time your missiles arrive, the geese have landed on an oil slick. In frustration, the missiles destroy each other. You should:
    (A) Keep flying to Russia, and defect.
    (B) Tell the Sierra Club about the Navy's efforts to safeguard wildlife.
    (C) Testify before Congress that you have prevented the Soviets from developing nuclear-enhanced geese.
    (D) Claim a 110% kill ratio, and receive a battlefield promotion.

32. During maneuvers near an interstate highway Jeff accidentally steers his TOW anti-tank missile into the rear end of a Pinto. Jeff should:
    (A) Yell, "Incoming!"
    (B) Breathe a sigh of relief, because this Pinto is a dud.
    (C) Ask an Indiana court to bar all evidence pertaining to the missile's design and construction.
    (D) Report directly to Washington that a hi-tech weapon has actually hit something.

ADMINISTRATION

33. Francis is the head of a large federal agency. He is ordered to cut his budget 20 percent. Francis should:
    (A) Cut essential services to the poor, but maintain administrative expenses at their current level.
    (B) Cut essential services to the poor, but *increase* administrative expenses to "deal with the crisis" his cuts will create.
    (C) Maintain services, but consolidate administrative positions and fire unproductive civil servants.
    (D) Patiently explain to Congress that he favors austerity, but that the cut can be achieved only by dumping massive quantities of nuclear waste into the irrigation canals of the San Joaquin Valley.

S T O P

IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED (C) TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, *DO NOT* TURN THE PAGE. *DO NOT* CONTINUE THE EXAMINATION. PUT DOWN YOUR PENCIL AND IMMEDIATELY BOARD A PLANE FOR WACO, TEXAS.

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34. Ron (not his real name) is president of the United States. He learns of a segregated school where students carry firearms and train for "counterinsurgent rape" of ERA supporters. Ron should:

(A) Grant the school a tax exemption.

(B) Not endorse the school's policies, but instruct the IRS to respect its sacred First Amendment rights.

(C) Nominate the school's principal to be head of the Civil Rights Commission.

(D) Explain that he inadvertently went out of his way to accidentally, unintentionally hand-write a memo in the school's favor.

THE PRESS

35. Theodore holds a series of breakfast meetings with a high administration official, who makes startling statements about the true nature of presidential policies. The official says his statements may be quoted, but only if the article appears in the publication "that's on the back burner." By this he means:

(A) *American Nurse.*

(B) *Boy's Life.*

(C) *Harper's, Esquire, The New Yorker* or *The Washington Monthly.*

(D) The Washington *Star.*

36. Gina has a series of clandestine meetings with a high administration official, who reveals startling information about corruption at the White House bowling alley. The conversation is on a "deep attribution, not-for-background" basis. This means Gina:

(A) Cannot print the information. She has been told only to confuse her.

(B) Cannot print the information, unless she confirms it independently by asking three other reporters what they think.

(C) Can print the information, but only if she herself does not know the identity of her source.

(D) Can print the information, but only if she refuses to reveal her own identity.

37. Pamela wishes to obtain a job as Washington correspondent for a major television network. She should practice:

(A) Standing on the White House lawn.

(B) Standing on the Capitol lawn.

(C) Standing on the Ellipse and shouting "I think I see the helicopter!"

(D) Saying, "Still, it's too soon to tell. One thing is certain, though: life goes on."

S T O P

Recognizing contemporary trends in education, the D.C.A.T.s are a "pass/fail" examination. A perfect score—800—is the only passing grade. Those failing to score 800 will never be allowed to conduct a fact-finding tour, publish an op-ed piece, or write off the cost of lunch. They will have to spend the rest of their lives in inexpressible drudgery, working for a company that actually makes products and living someplace like Wisconsin or Louisiana. Anyone scoring below 650 will be forced to get married and settle down, while those scoring below 500 will be required to have children.

For a copy of the correct answers send your American Express card to the Arbitrary Testing Service (ATS), P.O. Box 800, Princeton, New Jersey.

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Tidbits & Outrages

Reaganomics Meets Rodeo Drive: Part VI

MENAGE A TROIS: IN A SINFULLY DELICIOUS THREE-WAY RELATIONSHIP

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"The Swing Shift Was Coming On"

Police in Columbus, Ohio, recently left the body of an apparent suicide victim hanging from a beam for more than an hour after it was discovered. "Due to restrictions on overtime, detectives had to change shifts in the middle of the investigation," homicide squad Sgt. John Shawkey told the *Columbus Dispatch*.

Omaha Behind Closed Doors

Shortly after the Nebraska Accountability and Disclosure Commission adopted a resolution in January asserting that a legislative bill to abolish it would "diminish the openness and accountability of government," members of the panel told observers to leave the hearing room so they could convene in a closed session.

A Spokesman at the Pearly Gates Explained Wriston Still Won't Get In Until Prime Drops to Five Percent

The Pioneer National Title Insurance Company recently teamed up with Citicorp to save a New York church by turning it into a "condominium unit." The ad copy explaining the move is headlined: "How We Helped Citicorp Answer St. Peter's Prayers."

Phase One of Weinberger's Ambitious Cost-Cutting Plan

We found this month that when press officers at the Pentagon send out file photos, they sometimes save tissue paper by wrapping them in a crumpled picture of former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown.

That Royal Doulton Doesn't Go Quite Right in the Soup Kitchen

In Michigan, whose unemployment rate is one of the nation's highest, Hudson's department store advertises china using a Nancy Reagan look-alike. The ad copy begins, "No need for anyone to entertain with a mis-matched table."

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Present at the Fabrication

by Edward C. Ingraham

When *The Washington Post* recently revealed that Alexander Haig actually had the temerity to speak candidly in private meetings with his senior staff, it was generally assumed that the mole within the state department feeding the *Post* possessed verbatim transcripts of the secretary's tape-recorded comments. Closer inspection of the *Post* stories, however, reveals that Haig's reference to the British foreign secretary as a "duplicitous bastard" and other such delicacies were compiled merely on the basis of *notes*.

The distinction, as we'll see momentarily, is rather important. In fact, if the case of one Henry A. Kissinger is any indication, the conversations of secretaries of state as recorded by state department personnel should be read with some skepticism. Consider, for instance, the notes covering conversations that took place at the department during Kissinger's last year in office. These transcripts convey the content of the meetings that took place; they are respectful of the secretary of state and his foreign visitors; and they are works of complete historical fiction. I know. I helped fabricate them.

Let me back up a bit. Since the days of Sheba's mission to Solomon, foreign ministries have kept permanent records of significant high-level meetings by preparing something that the British call "minutes" and the Americans refer to as a "memorandum of conversation," or, in bureaucratic jargon, a "memcon." This is a detailed summary of what transpired at the meeting in question, customarily prepared by the most junior officer present—usually a country director, an ambassador, or a deputy assistant secretary. When the meeting involves two governments, both sides prepare memcons. Neither side officially sees the other's memcon, although if the officers charged with preparing them are friends, there is often an unofficial sharing of their hastily written notes.

These memcons have nothing to do with the official communiques issued to a waiting world after an important meeting. Memcons are confidential documents that describe what actually happened. Communiques usually are drafted jointly by the two sides well in advance of the meetings, and at times bear little resemblance to what the participants said. I recall one occasion years ago when I realized to my horror that I had forgotten to prepare a communique for a meeting between American and Australian officials. The meeting was actually in progress when this dire thought hit me. When the delegates broke for lunch I rushed over to my counterpart, the most junior member of the Australian delegation. Over lunch we hastily put together a communique that had both sides resolutely condemning China for meddling in Southeast Asian affairs. The communique was given perfunctory approval by both delegation leaders and promptly released to the press. The next morning's *Washington Post* headlined the story. In fact, China had not even been mentioned in the meeting.

The memcon has become an especially useful device for diplomatic and foreign policy exchanges in part because it is not a verbatim transcript. Senior diplomats speak more frankly and can get their positions across more vividly when they can be confident that their exact words cannot come back later to haunt them. Thus even high-level meetings between political leaders or

Edward C. Ingraham, a retired foreign service officer, is the author of a 1980 Foreign Service Journal *article revealing that the Carter administration's ambassador to Singapore was not aware that Korea is divided into two parts.*

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senior diplomats rarely are transcribed word for word; a memcon usually serves as the only permanent record.

Henry's Human Touch

Or so it worked until 1976, when Henry Kissinger, sensing he was about to enter the maw of history, ordered some changes. The first of those involved the people who wrote the memcons—me and my fellow country directors. We first learned about the change at one of those staff meetings that chew up so much time in the government. This one was chaired by my boss, the assistant secretary for far eastern affairs, who rounded up his deputies and the ten or so country directors in his area for an informal chat about the week's events, policy nuts and bolts, and a report on what was happening on the Seventh Floor, the abode of the secretary himself. Our meetings always followed the secretary's weekly senior staff meetings, which our assistant secretary attended and from which he could bring us the latest Seventh-Floor views and dicta.

At this particular meeting the assistant secretary opened by gazing at us silently for a moment, before announcing that he had brought from the senior staff meeting an order to all country directors from Secretary Kissinger. All of us, he noted, were in frequent contact with the secretary, escorting senior foreign visitors calling on him, accompanying the top bureau officials to his office when issues affecting the countries they covered were to be discussed, and, inevitably, drafting the memcons of these meetings. Brought up on middle-class American etiquette, we automatically followed the practice of greeting Kissinger politely when we entered his office, mouthing the appropriate words and receiving in return a brief acknowledgement from the secretary of our existence. This sort of social contact presumably had been going on since Thomas Jefferson's day.

But these days of common courtesy were now over. Henceforth, we were told, Kissinger would no longer recognize or respond to country directors accompanying higher-ranking officers to his office, nor to anyone else below the rank of deputy assistant secretary. Country directors were not to speak to the secretary when they entered his office; no respectful greetings, no "good morning, sir," nothing. Unless specifically asked for a comment, they were to remain silent in his presence.

There was a sharp intake of breaths around the table, followed by a brief explosion. Country directors are fairly senior in the hierarchy, roughly equivalent in rank to ambassadors or deputy chiefs of overseas missions. (My own successor on the job, for example, had been ambassador to a small country before replacing me.) To be told that we must behave like Victorian children, seen but not heard in Kissinger's presence, was at first hard to believe. One officer spluttered that even bus boys in restaurants got an occasional friendly nod from the customers. Another, a 30-year veteran, huffed that he had met every secretary of state since Dean Acheson and that every one of them—"even Foster Dulles"—had shown the elementary courtesy to say hello to his subordinates.

The assistant secretary let us run on for a while and then reminded us gently that we were professional diplomats, committed to following the orders of the president's representative ("just like the marines") even when, as in this case, they seemed grotesque. If we disagreed strenuously, perhaps we could take the matter up with Kissinger himself. This could be a bit difficult, he observed, since we were under an injunction not to speak to him unless spoken to, and it didn't look as if we would be spoken to very often.

Our nation's official records are now enlarged by such throbbing passages as:* Kissinger*: "Mister Minister, how do you like your coffee?"

From that point on we began, unenthusiastically, to follow Kissinger's orders. Escorting a foreign visitor to his office, we would follow the guest through the door and stand mute as the secretary greeted him effusively and then ran his eyes across us as if we were part of the furniture. We would sit silently through the meeting, trying to avoid eye contact with the secretary and taking notes on a small pad for our memcon. At the end we silently escorted the visitor out of the office. We found it awkward at times not to join in the conversation, especially in small meetings where the group might include only the visitor, Kissinger, one of his personal assistants, and one of us, discussing something on which we were the department's resident experts. But we persevered, biting tongues and pressing lips firmly together. We all knew, some from hearsay, others from personal experience, that Henry Kissinger's most trivial orders should be ignored only at one's peril. None of us relished the prospect of a sudden transfer to Chad.

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Some foreign ambassadors were puzzled by the odd new behavior of the country directors with whom they had been dealing, unable to fathom why these ordinarily voluble Americans suddenly would freeze up when accompanying them to the secretary's office. Some were told about the secretary's order. I recall accompanying a group of visiting Indonesian officials to see Kissinger in the summer of 1976. Among them was the Indonesian ambassador, a perceptive and witty man. He preceded me through the door, shook hands with the beaming secretary, turned, took me by the arm and said with a broad smile, "And of course, Your Excellency, you will be happy to see that our good friend Mr. Ingraham is with us today." Trapped, the secretary gave me a cold eye, a muttered "hello," and a fish-belly hand.

Pin-Striped Playwrights

We had not known there was to be another shoe, but several weeks later it dropped. The locale was the same—the bureau's weekly staff meeting. Looking apprehensive, the assistant secretary took a deep breath and told us that he had another order directly from Kissinger. Henceforth, he said, we would not be required to prepare memcons of the secretary's meetings. He paused while we marveled. Instead of memcons, he continued, for every one of the secretary's meetings—in-house gatherings as well as those involving foreign participants—the country director was to prepare a complete verbatim transcript of the discussion and submit it to the secretariat within 48 hours. Did we have that straight: a full, verbatim transcript?

We all knew that Henry Kissinger's most trivial orders could be ignored only at one's peril. None of us relished the prospect of a sudden transfer to Chad.

After the first howl died down, we tried logic. This was an utterly impossible task. While most of us had been drafting memcons for decades and considered ourselves skilled note-takers, none of us knew the first thing about shorthand. We couldn't possibly function as stenographers. In any event, not even a stenographer would be able to handle some of the meetings we covered. It would take a person with special training—like a court reporter—to prepare such a transcript.

The assistant secretary patiently heard us out and again reminded us that we were "professionals." Rather than protest, shouldn't we start considering just how we were going to carry out the secretary's orders? He suggested we review the picture. We knew we were unable to prepare transcripts, but Kissinger did not know that. What's more, the secretary obviously was a busy man. We could reasonably assume that he would be unlikely to find the time for a personal review of the transcripts we prepared. The secretariat staff surely would go over them with a beady eye, but no one from the secretariat staff would have attended the meeting. In the unlikely event the secretary did glance at one or two of the transcripts, we should remember that he was a man who spent the greater part of every working day in almost constant conversation and that the odds were against his remembering his own exact words of several days earlier. As to the words of the foreign participants, the assistant secretary's impression was that Kissinger never did listen too closely to what they said anyway.

So it finally dawned on us that what we needed was to develop techniques later perfected by a certain *Washington Post* reporter covering child heroin use in the ghetto. We would have at our fingertips the substance of what was said at the meetings. All we had to do was put that substance in the form of a transcript, a one-act drama if you will, by creating plausible dialogue. The one exception to this was in the area of Kissinger's jokes, where we had better take pains to capture the exact words. But most important was at every meeting to keep writing constantly in our note pads when we were within eyesight of the secretary, so that he would thus be assured we were indeed preparing transcripts. Why not try it?

My first test came a few days later when the foreign minister from a Southeast Asian country came to town for a conference with Kissinger. Although he understood English well, the foreign minister was not fully at home in it and preferred to speak in his own language through an interpreter. Happily I knew the language well enough to start jotting down his words before the interpreter began putting them into English. Scribbling furiously, I found that with the aid of the interpreter-induced pauses I could get down a reasonable approximation of the foreign minister's actual words. On the other hand, since no interpreter was used for Kissinger's remarks, I found the task of transcribing them hopeless. When preparing the final transcript, I reconstituted them from my knowledge of the points that

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were made, aided by a sophomore course in creative writing I had taken a quarter-century earlier.

My colleagues and I were not so lucky when interpreters were not involved. One of the more agonizing of my later efforts was the back-to-back appointments of two Asian foreign ministers one morning during the 1976 U.N. General Assembly. Both, unhappily, were fluent in English, voluble, and fast talkers. Worse, Kissinger was already well acquainted with both of them and was more expansive than usual. The transcript I subsequently put together (once the muscles in my note-taking hand stopped twitching) nailed down the substance of both meetings accurately. At the same time, I was a bit uneasy to see it leave the office for the secretariat because the words I put into the mouths of the principals were entirely my own creation, bearing only coincidental resemblance to the actual dialogue. At one point, for example, my handwritten notes read something like this: "R raised Timor UN — concerned US domestic opp. — K reassured — opp. ignorant — USG firm." The final transcript transformed these bare bones into a lively exchange:

Foreign Minister: We are also worried, Mr. Secretary, about the Timor vote in the General Assembly. There seems to be a good deal of domestic opposition here in the United States to our joint position. Can we still count on you?

The Secretary: You're quite right. There is opposition here, but most of it is coming from people who couldn't find Timor on a map to save their lives. I can assure you that we will stand firm on this issue.

In this case, as in all the others, things turned out pretty much as our assistant secretary had predicted. To my knowledge, none of us was ever challenged by the secretariat or by the secretary over the content of our transcripts.

Some of our earlier submissions were returned by the secretariat for re-working, but only on the unexpected grounds that they were not complete enough; although they had all the substantive dialogue, they had omitted the opening pleasantries and the social chit-chat. Getting the message, we began constructing even more complete conversations. As a result, our nation's official records were enlarged by such throbbing passages as:

The Secretary: Mister Minister, how do you like your coffee?

Foreign Minister X: With sugar please, no cream.

We also had to prepare transcripts for the in-house meetings, where the cast of characters often included only Kissinger, our assistant secretary, and one of us country directors. The first two busily discussed the countries we covered while we wrote frantically to give the impression that we were catching every word. Later, with the complicity of the assistant secretary, we would construct an appropriate but largely imaginary dialogue.

It took us a while to learn that Kissinger wanted every word at even these small, informal sessions preserved for posterity. A country director colleague of mine once participated in a three-party meeting called by the secretary to discuss a relatively trivial issue. Rather than writing non-stop, my colleague contented himself with keeping a running summary of the conversation as it went along. He even managed to inject a word or two into the discussion. In the middle of the meeting Kissinger suddenly stopped talking, rose to his feet, strode to the door, and barked an order to the staff outside. One of his aides scurried in, joined the circle, and spent the rest of the meeting taking non-stop notes. When the meeting broke up the assistant secretary returned to his own office but shortly was summoned back to Kissinger's for a harsh tongue-lashing because his country director had been so obviously flouting the secretary's order.

Once it was forcibly impressed upon us that even the in-house meetings were to be reproduced down to the chit-chat, we did so with gusto. I recall one such meeting at which Kissinger asked petulantly about a missing participant. I immortalized the conversation this way:

The Secretary: I thought Larry was supposed to be here. Where is he?

Assistant Secretary X: I'm sorry Mr. Secretary. I believe he's on a short vacation—Jamaica, I believe.

The Secretary: Jamaica? On a bureaucrat's salary?

By the beginning of 1977, most of the country directors had become quite adept at the art of creative transcripts. A few even had begun to affect a tweedy air—briar pipes and argyles—in order to reflect the new literary atmosphere. If our emotions weren't exactly mixed when Kissinger departed after the Carter inauguration and newly installed Secretary Cyrus Vance put an end to our literary efforts, there was a vague feeling of lost poetic license, nonetheless.

We'll get over it, I suppose. And there's always the satisfaction of knowing that when critics like William Shawcross and Seymour Hersh suggest that Kissinger's memoirs show a flair for the fictional, we can take a little credit, too. □

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WHO'S WHO in the Administration

Edwin L. Harper, who replaced **Martin Anderson** earlier this year as assistant to the president for policy development, is said by insiders to already be asserting far more authority than Anderson ever did. But Harper is a manager, not a thinker; so the power will be used to keep the paper flowing smoothly, not to influence its content. . . .

Edwin Meese recently told a group of Californians, "In all honesty, the person who has best exemplified the qualities I would like to follow has been the president." In a spirit reminiscent of Jack Valenti's "I sleep better knowing Lyndon Johnson is my president," Meese went on to note that next to his own father, Reagan has been his most important role model. Meese's tender words of affection are relevant to today's White House in-fighting. For weeks this winter Meese was under severe threat from the agents of **James Baker,** who leaked one unfavorable story after another about Meese, culminating in one that had him scheduled for exile to the justice department. The natural response to a situation like that is to cling closer to one's remaining source of tenure. When one of the Californians asked what he looked for first in those who work for him, Meese replied immediately, "Number one—loyalty."

The campaign against Meese has died down of late. When things are going badly, public squabbling at the top makes people think an administration is disintegrating. Meese's adversaries are intent on avoiding that impression. . . .

In

WHITE HOUSE

Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget—**Joseph W. Wright Jr.** has been deputy secretary of Commerce.

Director, Office of Policy Development—**Roger B. Porter** has been special advisor to the president for policy development.

Director, White House Office of Policy Information—**Edwin Gray** has been director of the White House Office of Policy Development.

Assistant to the Counselor to the President—**Kenneth Cribb** has been assistant director for cabinet affairs.

AGRICULTURE

Director, Office of the Consumer Advisor—**Isabel Wolf** has been an associate professor at the University of Minnesota.

DEFENSE

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff—General of the Army **John W. Vessey Jr.** has been vice chief of staff of the army.

HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Director, National Institutes of Health—**James Wyngaarden** has been a professor and chairman of the Duke University School of Medicine.

STATE

U.S. Chief of Protocol—**Selwa Roosevelt** is a free-lance journalist and Washington socialite.

Special Advisor to the Secretary—**Richard Fairbanks** has been assistant secretary for congressional relations.

AGENCIES AND COMMISSIONS

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Deputy Director—**Robert T. Grey Jr.** was director of the Advanced Technology Office in the Bureau of International, Environmental and Scientific Affairs at the State Department.

Environmental Protection Agency
Assistant Administrator for Waste and Emergency Response—**Rita M. Lavelle** has been director of communications for Aerojet-General Corporation.

Equal Employment Opportunities Commission
Chairman—**Clarence Thomas** has been assistant secretary for civil rights in the Department of Education.

Interstate Commerce Commission
Commissioner—**Malcolm M.B. Sterrett** has been vice president and general counsel for the U.S. Railway Association.

Out

WHITE HOUSE
Assistant to the Counselor to the President—**Edwin W. Thomas Jr.** has resigned to become regional administrator for the General Services Administration in California.

DEFENSE
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff—Air Force General **David C. Jones** has retired.

EDUCATION
Assistant Secretary for Elementary and Secondary Education—**Vincent E. Reed** has resigned to become vice president for communications at *The Washington Post.*

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The Political Puzzle

by John Barclay

The numbers indicate the number of letters and words, e.g., (2,3) means a two-letter word followed by a three-letter word. Groups of letters, e.g., USA, are treated as one word.



ACROSS

1. Opponent of choice and I ban station riot together. (4-11)
9. Fires and takes a vacation. (4, 3)
10. Some birdmen show their humor. (7)
11. Below intelligent, organized CIO norm. (7)
12. French build manor between two points. (7)
13. Game rubs men the wrong way. (7)
15. Laugh at crazy clothier? Not I! (7)
17. Hangover to disburse around the country. (7)
20. Times Square restaurant covers floorboards? (7)
22. Sings for fruit? (7)
23. Sings for railroad once nothing worked out. (7)
25. Chants for Ronnie T. (7)
26. Motion and lack thereof. (7)
27. Anachronistic policy changes, *i.e.*, Ron's great cage. (4, 11)

DOWN

1. Anger must result from logical presentations. (9)
2. Intricate remote hydrogen principle. (7)
3. Reorganize and/or decorate. (5)
4. Sherbert-free diet for management sites? (7)
5. Very large sinker. (7)
6. The last one passes muster, too. (9)
7. Approximate nice tax deduction. (7)
8. Tries to follow pro and con. (5)
14. Animals block the planes. (9)
16. Treat nine, treat strangely. (9)
18. He shook thus in past. (7)
19. Dugout skills rising for cleanup tool. (4, 3)
20. Hear vic playing old record. (7)
21. Moved time around, not the composer. (7)
22. Former church official. (5)
24. Works a rope clumsily. (5)

Answers to last month's puzzle:



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

Where to Stay in Washington

Five Minutes' Walk from the White House

A lot of history has taken place here—some of it in these hotels. And with OMB, Treasury, the FDIC, Commerce, the Veterans Administration, the Office of Personnel Management, Interior, and of course the White House, nearby, there's still plenty of activity. All the hotels are within a block or two of a subway stop from where it is just minutes to Capitol Hill or the Mall, with its monuments and museums. And right in the area are some of the best restaurants in Washington.

The Capital Hilton, 1001 16th St. N.W. (202) 393-1000 (or call the Hilton reservation number in your city). This, when it was called the Statler, is where FDR made his Fala speech. As a Hilton it has become one of the main convention hotels in the city, with 18 meeting rooms and a ballroom that can accommodate 1,400, plus a lobby lined with airline ticket offices and gift shops to care for the attendees' needs. Recent renovations have given the hotel's public rooms a fresh, art deco air, and the rooms will soon be the same. Singles, $65-$110; doubles, $85-$130; executive suites, $130, single or double; suites (some with refrigerators or kitchens), $250-$350. All children in the same room with their parents are free. There are several weekend packages and a special rate for rooms during July and August. For restaurants, there's a choice of **Trader Vic's** polynesian fare, the attractive and fairly expensive **Twig's**, and a cheerful coffee shop. Valet parking is available at a nearby garage.

Lombardy Towers, 2019 I St., N.W. (202) 828-2600, (800) 424-5486. It's definitely not in the luxury category and is a few minutes farther from the White House, but for the price, you get a lot of room for your money. The Lombardy was once an apartment building, which accounts for its spaciousness and for the kitchens in most rooms. If you don't want to cook, the **Lombardy Cafe** serves three reasonably priced meals. Regular rooms are $59, single, and $69 double; suites, $63-$72 single, $73-$82 double. Children under 12 are free, and extra adults in room, $10 each. On weekends all rooms are $35 a night, single or double. Free pool and sauna passes are available for use at **The Georgetown Hotel,** a short cab ride away. A small meeting room will hold up to 50 people.

The Hay Adams, 800 16th St. N.W. (202) 638-2207, (800) 223-6625. About a century ago John Hay and Henry Adams built two stately homes on this corner of 16th and H Streets. The hotel, built on this site in 1929, maintains their aura, with an elegant paneled lobby and dining room, elaborate molded ceilings, and fireplaces and french doors in many of the guest rooms. Singles, $105-$155; doubles, $145-$175; suites, $255-$525. Children under 12 are free; parking is $9 a night. With these prices come turndown service, terrycloth robes, complimentary shoe shines, and *The Washington Post* in the morning. If you can afford the already high rates, our recommendation is to go all the way and pay the higher price for a room with the best view in Washington: out over Lafayette Park to the White House. **Le Danielle** is the only, and expensive, restaurant. There's live piano music in the **Lafayette Pavilion** evenings. Ten meeting rooms can accommodate up to 175 people.

The Park Central, 705 18th St. N.W. (202) 393-4700. You can't get closer to the West Wing of the White House, as John Hinckley obviously knew when he checked in here a year ago. But if you also have business in the World Bank/International Monetary Fund complex, with the Department of Interior, Office of Personnel Management or George Washington University and need to keep your expenses down, this is a good choice. It, too, was once an apartment building, and about half the rooms have kitchens and there's a laundromat in the basement. Singles, $47-$57; doubles, $64-$69; suites (with separate bedroom, parlor, kitchen) $62-$74. On weekends all rates are discounted 25 percent. Children under 12 are free. There are several parking garages nearby. **Blackie's Jr.**, right off the lobby, serves hamburgers and steaks for lunch and dinner, and **Kay's** New York style deli is right next door for all three meals. In nice weather you can go to the hotel roof for sunning and the view.

(continued on page 60)

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Taylor Branch ON POLITICAL BOOKS

In August 1955, John Prados tells us,* the CIA's Richard Bissell went to the White House to show President Eisenhower some pictures that had been taken from an airplane more than ten miles above the earth. Greens, fairways, and sand traps were clearly visible in the aerial shots of the Augusta National Country Club in Augusta, Georgia, which was not only the home of the Masters but also Ike's favorite golf course. The photos clearly impressed the president, who recognized the topography of certain memorable holes. Then Bissell played his trump card. He pointed out that the pictures actually revealed the presence of golf balls on some of the greens, as well as the flags in the cups. This truly impressed Eisenhower, who must have reflected that sometimes he had trouble seeing the cup when standing over a ten-foot putt. Bissell, on the strength of the demonstration, asked for permission to develop a U-2 spy plane that could produce such pictures from even higher altitudes, and Eisenhower, who was normally skeptical of new military gadgets, heartily approved. Thus, through crafty persuasion and awesome technology, the CIA won its battle against the air force for control of a new spy system.

With technology that has long since made Bissell's U-2 obsolete, the secret services now stand on permanent watch against nuclear attack. Simultaneously, they grapple clandestinely with their adversaries in localized conflicts that policy-makers want to keep quiet, fearing Armageddon. These two functions have brought spy organizations to the forefront of modern politics since World War II, as intelligence activities have expanded on both the highest and lowest of roads. The same Richard Bissell who showed Eisenhower the golf course photographs planned the Bay of Pigs invasion.

The Soviet Estimate is a readable and even-tempered chronicle of the higher road—the effort of the CIA and military intelligence services to keep track of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Prados has assembled the first comprehensive record of American performance in this field, matching predictions of Russian strength against what ends up actually happening in the arms race. Working from National Intelligence Estimates that, ironically, are the most sensitive and yet the most publicly debated spy products we have, he labors to separate the contributions of hard fact from those of prejudice, and he makes convincing judgments about the bureaucratic wars within the intelligence community.

The human element of intelligence mistakes was more easily exposed during the early years, when the spy network was relatively unsophisticated. Shortly before a 1955 Soviet-American summit meeting, the Russians invited Colonel Charles E. Taylor, the air force attache in Moscow, to watch an aerial parade at Tushino Field. Sitting in the reviewing stand, Colonel Taylor was astounded to watch 28 Bison bombers fly over in a succession of formations. As Prados notes, this was twice the number of Bisons attributed to the Russians only a few months before and four times the number of B-52s then in existence. Taylor's alarming report quickly became the basis for another drastic upward revision of the National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet strategic bombers.

What Colonel Taylor had no way of knowing at the time was that the Russians were so insecure about the American lead in nuclear weaponry that they had circled their few Bisons repeatedly over the airfield as a blustering show of strength. The Russians fooled the Americans—especially the air force, which was eager to be fooled so that it could build more B-52s—and thereby helped create the "bomber gap," which was the first major hoax in postwar strategic intelligence.

Several years later, about the time the CIA and the army and navy managed to push the air force back toward reality on Soviet bombers, the Russians launched their Sputnik. They also tested some ICBMs before they were expected to, causing a wave of apprehension in the United States. The 1958 National Intelligence Estimate predicted that the Russians would solve all their test problems almost instantaneously, and that Moscow would produce and deploy up to 1,000 ICBMs by 1961. By contrast, the United States had only ten ICBMs in 1960. This was the "missile gap." There was a great public scare, and the shape of the weaponry involved encouraged journalists to imply that national manhood was at stake, along with survival. The Alsop brothers reported that the Eisenhower administration was about to "flaccidly permit the Kremlin to gain an almost unchallenged superiority."

As is well known, John Kennedy was elected on his virile pledge to change that with a greatly accelerated ICBM program, but by the time he took office the missile gap was revealed to be a larger hoax than the bomber gap. The CIA, joined by navy and army intelligence, now realized that the Russians had produced no ICBMs at all. The air force, after a Strangelovian campaign of resistance during which Strategic Air Command generals went so far as to claim that Crimean War memorials were actually Soviet ICBMs in disguise, finally conceded.

The result of all this confusion was the Defense Intelligence Agency, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's well-intentioned but ultimately counter-productive effort to end public disputes between the military intelligence services. To McNamara, such squabbling was inefficient as well as politically embarrassing. He wanted a unified, accurate military position on intelligence matters. In the DIA, however, he got an agency that tended to produce brokered intelligence compromises that were

Taylor Branch is a contributing editor of The Washington Monthly.

* *The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength.* John Prados. Dial, $17.95.

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

SUSAN FALLOWS

vague and all but useless. Traditional inter-service rivalries were muffled, as the generals and admirals no longer challenged each other's claims about Russian weaponry. Ominously, this left the civilians at the CIA as the only bureaucratic force to dispute the now-united military. In any match-up of that kind, the less hawkish CIA was sure to lose.

This became especially clear when the Soviets, responding to our overwhelming 8-to-1 superiority in strategic missiles, intensified their own missile program in the late 1960s. This time, as Prados noted in a detailed review of the National Intelligence Estimates, the CIA underestimated both the actual and intended rates of deployment. The agency would pay for such a dovish error, which coincided with the peak years of the Vietnam war. (Prados doesn't guess whether or not the CIA down-played the Russian build-up deliberately, to help President Johnson with his budget problems during the war.) President Nixon came into office just in time to accuse the agency of being soft in its most vital duty.

Secretary McNamara, meanwhile, had proceeded to MIRV the U.S. missile force and thereby achieve a quantum leap in nuclear firepower. He had done so even at a time when he considered the American arsenal far superior to the Russian one, on reasoning borrowed from American business planning. As a matter of sound managerial practice, McNamara held that weapons systems were so complicated they needed to be planned far in advance, based on calculations of what the Russians might be producing five years ahead. The key phrase, he said, was the "lead time." This doctrine shifted the focus of the entire defense debate from the CIA's strongest suit—current Soviet weapons deployments as observed by spy satellites—to guesses about the Soviet intention, which are always tenuous at best. One side effect of the doctrine was to give the military services further incentive to design complicated rather than simple weapons systems. The more complicated the weapon that was projected to be in the Soviet arsenal years ahead, the earlier the Americans needed to begin designing a weapon that would be at least comparable and preferably more sophisticated.

This gave an advantage to the military wish list, but the CIA believed it strengthened its hand too. From the agency's point of view, the new Soviet weapons increased the value of American intelligence. Complicated weapons had to be tested for years in advance of deployment, they reasoned, and the CIA was thus capable of monitoring the Russian tests almost as well as the Russians themselves.

But the fact that the monitoring techniques of the late 1960s were worlds advanced from those of Colonel Taylor at the air show did not mean much by itself. To be sure, the new techniques seemed to offer the possibility of controlling the arms race, because the Americans knew exactly what weapons the Russians possessed, what they were testing, and how the tests were progressing. Unfortunately, that wasn't enough. American politicians regarded these impressive capabilities as a nuisance, and with the focus of intelligence now shifting to the far more subjective issue of Soviet intentions, the policymakers could get away with scoffing at the CIA's optimistic reports.

Nixon's defense secretary, Melvin Laird, for instance, found his campaign for expensive weapons like the ABM jeopardized by the CIA, which kept issuing contrary reports on the Russian weapons. The agency declared that the Soviet ABM system was so primitive as to be obsolete, and that any threatening ABM was years away because the Russians had not even tested the required components.

These reports nettled Laird so much that he publicly criticized the CIA for presuming to know what the Russians could achieve in advance. President Nixon himself joined the attack. When the CIA stood behind its facts, Laird took the extraordinary step of simply ignoring the CIA's National Intelligence Estimates. He never again referred to them in his budget requests.

With the CIA under intense pressure within the government, Henry Kissinger entered the contest. Kissinger is the principal villain in Prados's account of the recent past. Instead of moving to protect the agency's scientific capabilities, he chose to advance his own position by taking advantage of its political vulnerability. He joined Laird's boycott of the CIA's intelligence product, calling its estimates of Soviet strength "Talmudic exercises," meaning that they were obscurely pedantic. He and the Pentagon criticized the CIA's estimates of Soviet military spending so vocally that the weakened agency eventually changed its accounting system to make the Russian defense budget look bigger. This political admission further undercut the agency's claim to

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objectivity, which had been its principal asset. Finally, according to Prados, Kissinger induced Director William Colby to abolish the CIA's Board of National Estimates in favor of a new National Intelligence Officer system, under which a single CIA analyst would be responsible for synthesizing and interpreting the intelligence data on each technical aspect of the Soviet arsenal. Each analyst would act alone, no longer supported by the BNE or the CIA as an institution, and do battle with the combined weight of the military intelligence bureaucracies. Not surprisingly, the National Intelligence Officers have been overmatched despite all their computers and their sophisticated satellite readings. This system remains in effect, and the result is that military intelligence has been in resurgence at the expense of the CIA for nearly a decade.

Even the sober, moderate Prados allows himself to lament this development. If the CIA had a useful talent, it was in the field of pure intelligence as it related to the hard facts of the Russian weapons program. Much of the agency's skill and reliability could be attributed to the fact that it had no vested interest in the substance of its reports. When the political infighting became nasty, however, this same lack of a constituency allowed the military and the politicians to roll over the agency. No one rallied to the CIA's support because the battle was fought largely beyond public view and because defenders of arms control, the agency's natural allies, considered the CIA objectionable on other grounds.

Those other grounds have to do with the CIA's separate, more publicized function—operations to influence foreign countries covertly. This is the James Bond, dirty trick role. Treated seriously, this function has always provided most of the CIA's bureaucratic capital. Indeed, there often seems to be *too much* information. What makes the CIA director unique, and, in the president's eyes, indispensable, is that he alone can offer the option of doing something without having to take responsibility for it and with less chance of confronting the Russians. This is why nearly all the directors, including the current one, have backgrounds in CIA operations rather than intelligence. It is also why there was a great hue and cry in the mid-1970s when scandal brought a curtailment of CIA operations, whereas a few years earlier hardly a peep was raised when the agency was emasculated in the far more necessary area of strategic analysis. In truth, the low priority attached to such analysis by today's policymakers may be the agency's most serious problem of all. □

(continued from page 57)

The Sheraton Carlton, 923 16th St. N.W., (202) 638-2626, (800) 325-3535. The Carlton has also had its share of history. Through the still elegant lobby with its chandeliers, carved ceiling, gilded fixtures, and period furniture have passed the likes of Al Jolson, Katherine Hepburn, and John L. Lewis (who lunched here daily), and guests at White House dinners, which were held here during the Truman era when the White House was being restored. The guest rooms, while comfortable, are more traditional hotel-style, although everyone gets turndown service, a phone in the bath, electric shoe buffer and a complimentary *Washington Post* at the door. Singles, $99-$129; doubles, $119-$149; one-bedroom suites, $238-$313; two-bedroom suites, $338-$413. Children under 18 are free. There are weekend packages, and a special rate during July and August of $39.50 per night per person any night of the week. **The Carlton** is for elegant but expensive breakfast, lunch, and dinner and dancing on Saturday evening. **The Palm Court** offers the same menu in a lobby setting, and **The Alternative** is just what its name says: lighter and somewhat less expensive. For wine connoisseurs, **The Wine Bar** serves only vintage wine by the glass or bottle. The hotel doesn't encourage large meetings—there are six meeting rooms to accommodate from ten to 300 people.

"the most charming setting for outdoor dining in downtown Washington."
—The Washington Monthly

737-1370
Iron Gate Inn
1734 N St., Washington D.C.

The Hotel Washington, 15th St. and Pennsylvania Ave. N.W. (202) 638-5900. Although it's showing its age in a few places, the hotel, opened in 1918 and the home of former House Speaker John McCormack and dozens of other congressmen and senators, has been designated a national landmark. It's also right across the street from the Treasury and the Department of Commerce and within walking distance of the agencies located in the Federal Triangle. And if you're planning a visit in January 1984, book now for a room on the front with a first-class view of the inaugural parade as it turns up 15th towards the White House. Singles, $68-$73; doubles, $75-$86; suites, $170-$245. Children under 14, free; extra adults in a room, $10 each. On weekends, up to four people can stay in a room for $50 a night, and these rates are good every night of the week during July and August. The main restaurant, **The Two Continents**, moves up to the rooftop in May, where the wonderful view of the monuments, memorials, and up and down the Potomac makes up for any possible deficiencies in the food or service. **The Park**, on the lobby floor, serves lighter, cafe-style fare, with a view of the garden behind the Treasury. There are facilities for meetings of up to 500-600. Parking is available in nearby garages.

—Donna Fenn

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Political Booknotes

All in the First Family. *Bill Adler, Norman King. Putnam, $13.95.*

America and the Survivors of the Holocaust. *Leonard Dinnerstein. Columbia Univ. Press, $19.95.*

The Chariot of Israel: Britain, America and the State of Israel. *Harold Wilson. Norton, $19.95.*

Complexities and Contraries: Essays of Mild Discontent. *Eugene J. McCarthy. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, $10.95.*

Controlling the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s. *Lewis A. Dunn. Yale Univ. Press, $21/$6.95.* In some future regional dispute will the separatist Baluchi movement use stolen nuclear weapons against the Pakistani army? Will a power-crazed Latin American general threaten the use of the bomb to stage a coup d'etat? Will nuclear mercenaries become the new high-priced dogs of war? This book is long on such disturbing questions, though short on providing answers.

Dunn suggests that one method of controlling modern proliferation is for the U.S. to teach new nuclear powers to handle their bombs safely and responsibly—just like us (ignoring, of course, that big hole in the middle of Arkansas caused by an exploding Titan missile). This is about as reassuring as an alcoholic teaching a teenager to drink responsibly.

—Jeff Miller

Corporate Response to Declining Rates of Growth. *Katherine Hughes. Lexington, $23.95.*

The Defense Industry. *Jacques S. Gansler. MIT Press, $9.95.*

Energy Policy Analysis and Congressional Action. *Raymond C. Scheppach, Everett M. Ehrlich, eds. Lexington, $26.95.*

Felix Frankfurter and His Times: The Reform Years. *Michael E. Parrish. Free Press, $17.95.* Lively, sensible, and highly readable, this first of two volumes takes Frankfurter through his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1938. The book's only defect is an occasional lack of sophistication about legal issues.

—Charles Peters

The Guide to the Federal Budget. *Stanley E. Collender. Northeast-Midwest Institute, $8.* With all the talk about the budget these days, how many of us really know the differences between resolutions, authorizations, appropriations, reconciliations, recisions, and outlays? Remain in ignorance no longer—Collender has prepared a cram course that gives all the important buzzwords and explains how the budget process really works. Someone still needs to detail the more important matter of how Reagan has used this process for his own political ends; still, this overview will enable readers to understand at least what kind of language the main actors are speaking.

—M. N.

A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret Story of Chemical and Germ Warfare. *Robert Paxman, Jeremy Harris. Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, $14.95.* Chemical warfare was once hailed as a more humane form of warfare—hence the title, taken from the Nobel Prize acceptance speech of German scientist Fritz Haber. The authors refute that argument with numerous anecdotes illustrating the horrors of chlorine gas, anthrax, and the like. The portrait of Winston Churchill's dilemma during World War II—when the British almost used chemical weapons against the Germans—is also revealing, both of the man and of the strange new twists poison gas had introduced to warfare.

The authors, by exhaustively cataloguing the dangers of chemical and biological weapons, make a good case for dismantling them. But like so many books in this apocalyptic genre, the authors' outrage ultimately doesn't go beyond the predictable litany of horrors to give productive suggestions about how to do that.

—Lee Butler

Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath. *John Toland. Doubleday, $17.95.*

John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power. *Ronald W. Pruessen. Free Press, $19.95.* A balanced, thoughtful biography that takes Dulles through the Truman years and convincingly portrays him to have been considerably less hawkish than his reputation. Since the author relies largely on documentary sources, his book leaves unanswered questions that might have been resolved by personal interviews, and it lacks the kinds of anecdotes that bring documents to life.

—C. P.

The Kennedy Imprisonment: A Meditation on Power. *Garry Wills. Atlantic-Little, Brown, $14.95.* This is an intelligent but infuriating book. The author is onto most of the things that are wrong with the Kennedys, but, except when he describes events that he personally witnessed—like the 1980 New Hampshire primary or a dinner party at the Sargent Shrivers'—he is consistently off-register. An important example: he does not distinguish between the prisoner of toughness who authorized assassins and the president under whom less than a hundred Americans were killed in Vietnam while no Vietnamese were bombed by Americans.

A smaller example, but one that I happen to know about: Wills is probably correct in asserting that Ted Sorensen wrote much of *Profiles in Courage,* but he is wrong in implying Kennedy was intellectually inferior to Sorensen. I remember one night campaigning in West Virginia at a Unitarian church. Religion was the main issue in the primary and Kennedy was supposed to discuss it that evening, but he had lost his voice so Sorensen spoke for him. Sorensen made a skillful presentation. But when the questions started coming from the congregation Kennedy began jiggling his foot impatiently, and soon

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rose and in a croaked whisper started interrupting Sorensen to clarify points and deal with nuances that Sorensen had missed. In other words, Sorensen was bright but Kennedy was brighter. In fact, few, if any, of Kennedy's close associates thought he was a man who would let them do the thinking for him. (See also "Tilting at Windmills," January 1982 and in this issue.)

—*C.P.*

Labyrinth. *Taylor Branch, Eugene M. Propper. Viking, $17.95.*

Living Contradictions: The Women of the Sixties Come of Age. *Joanne Michaels. Simon & Schuster, $13.95.*

Love Canal: Science, Politics, and People. *Adeline Gordon Levine. Lexington, $24.95/$14.95.*

Love, Eleanor: Eleanor Roosevelt and Her Friends. *Joseph P. Lash. Doubleday, $19.95.*

Middletown Families: Fifty Years of Change and Continuity. *Theodore Caplow, et al. Univ. of Minnesota Press, $16.95.*

The New Subversives: Anti-Americanism of the Religious Right. *Daniel C. Maguire. Crossroad Press, $9.95.*

No One to Play With: The Social Side of Learning Disabilities. *Betty B. Osman. Random House, $12.50.*

Nuclear Culture: Living and Working in the World's Largest Atomic Complex. *Paul Loeb. Coward, McCann, & Geoghegan$14.95.*

Nuclear Illusion and Reality. *Solly Zuckerman. Viking, $10.95.*

Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam. *Larry Berman, Norton, $18.95.*

The Political Economy of Fiscal Limits. *John J. Kirlin. Lexington, $18.95.*

The Politician: The Life and Times of Lyndon Johnson. *Ronnie Dugger. Norton, $18.95.*

A Poor Harvest: A Clash of Policies and Interests in the Grain Trade. *Richard Gilmore. Longman, $22.50*

Running Time: The Films of the Cold War. *Nora Sayre. Dial, $12.95.*

The Second American Revolution and Other Essays (1976-1982). *Gore Vidal. Random House, $15.*

Security Policies of Developing Countries. *Edward A. Kolodziej, Robert E. Harkavy. Lexington, $35.95.*

Sexism: The Male Monopoly on History and Thought. *Marielouise Janssen-Jurreit. Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, $25.*

Silence Was a Weapon: The Vietnam War in the Villages. *Stuart A. Herrington. Presidio Press, $15.95.*

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

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The disease that will not die... an untold story.



SOURCE: National Center for Health Statistics—Monthly Vital Statistics Report, Vol. 29, No. 6, Supplement 2, 1978.

Many of us believe that pneumonia is a disease of the past—long ago conquered by antibiotics. The fact is that bacteria-caused pneumonia strikes between 400,000 to 500,000 people, causing from 20,000 to 50,000 deaths each year, according to U.S. Government reports. A high percentage of these illnesses and deaths can be prevented—by a vaccine that has been developed, tested and proven effective.

A few million people are immunized; many millions more should be. Unfortunately, the very people most susceptible to pneumococcal pneumonia—the elderly, those with a history of chronic ailments, such as respiratory illnesses, heart disease, diabetes and others—may not know about the vaccine. They need to be informed.

Public attention, mainly through the media, has been mobilized to fight against disease—notably polio, other childhood diseases, hypertension, glaucoma, TB, and others. The time is now for pneumococcal pneumonia to be on that hit list.

Lederle

For information about pneumococcal pneumonia vaccine, call or write:
Public Affairs Department, Lederle Laboratories,
Wayne, New Jersey 07470, 201/831-4684.

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"It's life as usual in the big wildlife reserve nearby," says Orval Fouse, Supervisor, Utilities & Environmental Engineering at Gulf's Port Arthur, Texas, refinery. "The snow geese still spend a few months here each year during migration. The marshes around the refinery are still full of raccoons, otters, minks, muskrats, even some deer and bobcats.

"To me, that's very good news, because it means they're totally unaffected by the fact that, for the past 20 years, we've been refining what's called 'sour crude.'

"We call it sour because it contains a lot of pollutants. We have to take some sour crude when we buy oil overseas. Of course, we can't release those pollutants into the air. So Gulf spent millions of dollars modernizing this refinery to handle this type of crude. For 20 years now, we've been refining over 100,000 barrels of sour crude a day, and as you can see by the wildlife around here, the air quality is as good as ever."

We have prepared a brochure, "In Search of Balance" on the ways and means of balancing energy and nature. You may have a copy, free, by writing to Mr. William B. Moffett, Vice President, Public Affairs, Gulf Oil Corporation, Department SG, Box 1166, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15.

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"Can oil and wildlife mix? They do at Gulf's Port Arthur refinery."

Snow Goose photographed near Port Arthur by Dr. John

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